

# The Social Dimension of Political Values

Elizabeth C. Connors\*

**Abstract.** Worries about the instability of political attitudes and lack of ideological constraint among the public are often pacified by the assumption that individuals have stable political values. These political values are assumed to help individuals filter political information and thus both minimize outside influence and guide people through complex political environments. This perspective, though, assumes that political values are independent of social context. This piece questions that assumption and argues that political values are socially transmitted—that is, that political values are not internal predispositions, but the result of social influence. I consider this idea with two empirical tests: an experimental test attempting to recreate the transmission of political values and an observational analysis of the effect of political discussions on political value endorsement. Results suggest that, indeed, political values are socially transmitted. Findings suggest the need to reevaluate our current conception of political values and the strength of social influence in politics.

Previous versions of this manuscript were presented at MPSA 2017, APSA 2017, and MPSA 2018. I thank Yanna Krupnikov, Jennifer Jerit, Peter DeScioli, Stanley Feldman, David Peterson, John Ryan, David Ciuk, Michael Wagner, Robert Bird, and Patrick Kraft for their feedback on previous versions.

\*Ph.D. Candidate, Stony Brook University

## Introduction

There is a normative democratic concern about the instability of political attitudes and lack of ideological constraint among the public (e.g., Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1960; Converse 1964). Indeed, as Valentino and Nardis (2013) claim, “If people do not have stable preferences over competing policies, as Downs’s (1957) economic theory of democracy demands, constructing a government that effectively translates majority preferences into policies is impossible” (568). The worry is—if the public has unstable attitudes that are easily manipulated by social influence, the media, and political elites (Zaller 1992), how can individuals make reasonable political choices or—at the very least—elect representatives that best serve their interests?

Zaller’s (1992) answer to this question is that people are not simply passive observers of political information. Instead, individuals filter this information from elites through “stable, individual-level traits”: political values (Zaller 1992, 22-24). Scholars have long considered political values an important component of preferences, arguing that political values influence ideology, issue attitudes, partisanship, and presidential evaluation (see Feldman 2013), and may even explain political choices *better than* ideology (Caprara and Vecchione 2013). As Nelson and Garst (2005), explain, “In lieu of political ideology, which most research suggests the general public lacks, values function as general standards for evaluating candidates, policies, and other objects in the political universe” (490).

Underlying this idea, however, is an important assumption that political values “transcend specific situations,” as Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) argue basic human values do.<sup>1</sup> It is assumed, for example, that when a person approaches a new political issue or decision, she will turn to her political values, among other predispositions, to inform that decision. In this view, political decisions can be coherent and fairly independent, even if the person lacks all the information or a clear ideology. If, however, political values fail to “transcend specific situations,” those decisions lack the independent and coherent quality that we seek. Essentially, if we are to assume that political values guide us, we must also assume that they are stable and not easily moved.

Yet, recent research provides doubt to this assumption, suggesting that political values are less stable, and perhaps more malleable, than previous research had assumed (e.g., Goren 2005, 2009; Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009; McCann 1997; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). These findings stand in contrast to research suggesting that political values are a consistent filter on outside political information. Addressing this conflicting research, I approach political values from a new perspective. I argue that, first, political values are *not* fundamental guides in the political world. Instead, I theorize that people adopt the political values of those around them because it is socially desirable to do so. Reported political values, I suggest, are a function of social

---

<sup>1</sup> While there is an abundance of literature on basic human values (see Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Rokeach 1968, 1973, 1979), this piece limits itself specifically to the discussion and empirical investigation of *political values* (Caprara and Vecchione 2013; Ciuk 2016; Ciuk 2017; Ciuk, Lupton, and Thornton 2017; Feldman 1988, 2003, 2013; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Goren 2005; Goren et al. 2009; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Jacoby 2006, 2014; Knutsen 1995; Kuklinski 2001; McCann 1997; Nelson and Garst 2005; Nelson et al. Oxley 1997; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010; Zaller 1992).

influence—implying, then, that political values may be no more stable or robust than basic political attitudes.<sup>2</sup>

This piece will proceed as follows. First, I define what scholars have meant by “political values.” Next, I build on existing research and consider the social dimension of political values. Finally, I present my empirical analyses: one that relies on an experiment and one that translates the experimental results into a broader perspective using observational data. The results suggest that endorsements of political values are shaped by one’s social environment, implying a new, social dimension to the political values we previously knew as robust and deep-seated.

## What Are Political Values?

Political scientists conceptually define political values as “abstract, general conceptions about the desirable or undesirable end-states of human life,” which provide people with a “general evaluative standard for confronting the world” (Jacoby 2006). Values are viewed as different from political attitudes in that the former can be applied to multiple issues rather than just a position on *one* issue. For example, it is not a value to oppose same-sex marriage, but one can value moral traditionalism, which will likely lead to opposing same-sex marriage. This same value—moral traditionalism—can also inform attitudes towards, for example, abortion, where valuing moral traditionalism will likely lead to being pro-life. Essentially, values are viewed as broader than political attitudes.

Scholars generally endorse this conceptual definition of political values, where political values are core to the self and guide political behavior—they argue that values account for most of individuals’ political preferences by leading people towards certain ideologies and political attitudes (see Caprara and Vecchione 2013). In fact, Schwartz et al. (2010) argue that values account for 54% of the variance in vote choice, concluding that values are foundational in explaining variation in political attitudes and behavior. This view of political values as guides in the political world is further enforced by research suggesting that political values help filter political information (Kam 2005; Zaller 1992) and guide people through complex political environments (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).

In contrast to this research, though, other research points to evidence that individuals’ endorsements of political values are less consistent—and more malleable—than originally assumed. Nelson et al. (1997), for example, show that issue framing can change the relevance of political values to individuals, and McCann (1997) finds that the endorsement of political values is constrained by candidate evaluation. Taking these ideas a step further, Goren (2005) and Goren et al. (2009) investigate the relationship between partisanship and values, finding that partisanship is more stable than certain political values (Goren 2005)<sup>3</sup> and that party source cues affect the expression of these values (Goren et al. 2009).

Yet even while acknowledging that values are heavily dependent on partisanship, Goren et al. (2009) resist the implications that values are largely a function of party preferences, noting that,

---

<sup>2</sup> Research finds that political attitudes can be influenced by social and survey contexts (e.g., Bartels 2003; Chong and Druckman 2007; Nelson et al. 1997; Klar 2014; Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), but the assumption is that political values are more stable.

<sup>3</sup> However, recent research in British elections found the opposite—that values were more stable than partisanship (see Evans and Neundorff 2018). This difference in findings could be due to many things, including difference in time, populations, electoral styles, and variable operationalizations.

“to be clear, we are not claiming that core political values are akin to other short-term perceptions. We believe, like many others, that political values are central elements in mass belief systems. Nor do we expect that partisan influence will produce wholesale value change. Instead, partisan forces should affect values at the margins, essentially leading identifiers to become a little bit more or less enamored of a given value” (Goren et al. 2009, 807).

Indeed, while Goren (2005) and Goren et al. (2009) suggest that causally values may be driven by partisanship, more recent work on political values returns to the idea that values guide certain political issue positions, over and above partisanship (e.g., Evans and Neundorf 2018).

The aforementioned research suggests two points. First, it demonstrates that much of the research in political science assumes that values are more robust than attitudes—that while attitudes can be shifted by changing context or social environment, values mean more to people and thus are more resistant to change. Second, it suggests that values may be more malleable than some of this foundational research on values assumes.<sup>4</sup> Building on this idea of malleability, in this manuscript I argue that people adopt the political values of those around them because it is socially desirable to do so. This is in contrast to conventional wisdom that assumes individuals’ reported political values to be more immutable than political attitudes.

Note, though, that this social adoption of values corresponds to the partisanship-aligned value polarization that we see—where Republicans emphasize morality, patriotism, and social order, and Democrats emphasize equality, economic security, and (to a lesser extent) freedom (Jacoby 2014). That is, although I argue that social desirability drives value endorsements, this does not mean that there should be one set of ideal political values. Since the two political parties endorse diametrically opposed sets of values, there should be similarly two sets of socially desirable values—one for Democrats and another for Republicans.

## **Social Influence & Value Endorsements**

***Social Context.*** Research suggests that people are highly motivated by social goals (Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Petersen 2015). Indeed, Goffman’s (1967) theory of face management claims that individuals present a “face”—or some positive social value—to others in attempt to exude the most positive impression of themselves. People then work at this type of “self-presentation” almost constantly (Holtgraves 1992), and will, in fact, consciously misreport themselves to either avoid embarrassment or to make themselves appear more impressive (Kuran 1997; Zaller and Feldman 1992). That is, the desire—or perhaps even the need—to create and maintain a positive impression plays a substantial role in individuals’ lives.

This tendency to misrepresent oneself based on self-presentation desires can be tracked by the self-monitoring trait, where those high in self-monitoring care more about impressing others than those low in self-monitoring do. An extreme version of this need for positive self-presentation

---

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted, though, that the aforementioned results do not entirely dismiss the idea that people have stable underlying values. Instead, the results suggest that political values are somewhat malleable and thus create suspicion that they can be political guides or filter new political information.

can lead to social desirability bias, which causes people (mostly high self-monitors) to alter survey responses based on perceived social norms (Berinsky 1999, 2002, 2004; Berinsky and Lavine 2012; Huddy et al. 1997; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Terkildsen 1993; Zaller and Feldman 1992). A key component of this is the desire to be similar to certain types of people or associated with positively-perceived groups in hopes of achieving a positive self-presentation. Thus, telling individuals that a socially desirable group has a certain attitude or conducts certain behavior will lead high self-monitors to change their attitudes and behavior to conform to that group (see Mutz 1998).

Beyond survey response, social influence can manifest itself in other powerful and political ways. Social settings can change the expression of partisan preferences (Klar 2014), lead people to suppress unpopular or contentious political opinions (Carlson and Settle 2016), and change how people describe their partisan identities (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). Similarly, findings suggest that social pressure—whether explicit or implicit—can alter political behavior by increasing voter turnout (Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber et al. 2008; Panagopolous 2014). Leaning on these findings, I expect that the same motivations that lead people to change their political preferences and behavior will also lead people to change their political values.

**Theory.** Given the importance of social influence in various aspects of political behavior, I theorize that the social environment can also influence individuals' reported political values. This theory is in contrast to conventional wisdom dictating that political values are far more robust than political attitudes—that they are more immune to the biases that plague the more mutable political opinions. Broadly speaking, my theoretic approach diverges from conventional wisdom and suggests that much like political attitudes, political values are mutable.

In particular, I argue that people report certain value positions because it helps them achieve a positive self-presentation. Note, though, that the perception of what is socially desirable can differ depending on one's social context, environment, or network. That is, a Democrat's interpretation of a socially desirable value likely differs from a Republican's interpretation of a socially desirable value (see Klar and Krupnikov 2016 for discussion of context influencing perceptions of social desirability). Thus, I argue that Democrats adopt the political values of other Democrats because they infer that it is socially desirable to value equality and moral tolerance (Democratic values). Or, Republicans reject equality and moral tolerance because their friends and family reject these values. Note that this assumption that most of a partisan's social network are of the same partisanship has strong empirical support (e.g., Mason 2015, Iyengar and Westwood 2015).

Though this proposed theory has not been explicitly tested, existing research hints that social factors may be important in value endorsements. Jacoby (2014), for example, finds that Democrats and Republicans endorse diametrically opposed values and have far less variability than the general public in their value rankings, suggesting that either political values lead to party identification, or the different social experiences of Democrats and Republicans has led to reports of different sets of values. Jacoby (2006), in fact, gives credence to the second possibility by noting in previous research that, "people experience vastly different socialization experiences and patterns of social interaction; it would be incredible if this did *not* have some noticeable effect on individuals' feelings about desirable and undesirable states of existence—i.e., values" (720). The theory proposed here specifically addresses this notion.

***Expectations and Empirical Approach.*** My empirical approach uses experimental and observational evidence to consider the expectation that people use social cues to determine the types of value responses that will make the most positive impression on others. I consider this using these two empirical approaches: a survey experiment and a set of analyses of observational data. While each approach comes with its own limitations, jointly they allow me to consider my theoretic expectations from two different perspectives.

I rely on the survey experiment to analyze the causal effect of social cues on value endorsement. In this experimental approach I also directly consider the extent to which individuals' desire to present the most positive version of themselves exacerbates the influence of social cues on value reports. To do so, I make use of *self-monitoring*, a characteristic that captures susceptibility to social pressure (Berinsky 2004; Berinsky and Lavine 2012; Gangestad and Snyder 2000; Lavine and Snyder 1996; Terkildsen 1993; Weber, Lavine, Huddy, and Federico 2014). If, as I expect, people rely on cues because they want to make the most positive impressions, the effect of the social cue will change at different levels of self-monitoring. I thus theorize that those high in self-monitoring (i.e., those most susceptible to social pressure) will alter their values to look good, but those low in self-monitoring (i.e., those least susceptible to social pressure) will not. Or, that the influence of the social cue on value endorsement will increase with higher levels of self-monitoring.

Further, to enhance the external validity of these findings and consider these patterns in a broader perspective, I then use American National Election Studies (ANES) data. Here I rely on the frequency of political discussions as a *proxy* for the likelihood an individual receives social cues about values. Essentially, I view discussions as vehicles for social pressure—as it is a forum where one is both able to discover that those around them endorse particular political values as well as be socially pressured to do the same. This implies that the more often one engages in discussions, the more likely she will be to receive social cues about values, and therefore the more she should align her values in response to those cues. That is, discussions should increase the likelihood that people get social cues from others about what partisans like them value. The result, I predict, is a greater alignment of one's reported values to their partisanship. Note that this empirical approach aims to examine the effect of social cues on value endorsement by both experimentally manipulating the independent variable, as well as measuring it (by proxy) in the “real world.” This approach enhances the overall validity of the findings by responding to an empirical question with various methods (see Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002).

The possibility that reported values are a manifestation of social cues carries a number of important implications. Most importantly, if reported values are manifestations of social cues, they are unlikely to be guiding people through a complex and manipulative political world as conventional wisdom (e.g., Converse 1964; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Zaller 1992) suggests. Essentially, worries about citizens' ability to engage in politics can no longer be alleviated by the existence of political values if we find that these values are shaped by the social environment.

## **Experiment**

The experiment aims to test if social cues will lead individuals to adopt political values. I predict that this will be moderated by the self-monitoring trait, where those high in self-monitoring will be influenced by the social cue but those low in self-monitoring will not. Given that political values are engrained in our political culture, using already-established political values would threaten

internal validity due to pretreatment (see Druckman and Leeper 2012 for discussion of pretreatment leading to internal validity threats). That is, since we know Democrats and Republicans already endorse different sets of values we can infer that they have already been “treated” with social cues in the real world. Thus, encountering an extra treatment in the context of the experiment would be redundant, and we would be unable to correctly estimate the causal effect of the social cue. Further, since the aim of this experiment is to capitalize on randomization of treatment and thus speak directly to internal validity, this potential threat of pretreatment is especially worrisome. Thus, the only way to truly examine the social transmission of values is with a *new* political value that has similar criteria to our current political values but is *unaligned* with political parties. So, for the purpose of the experiment, I created a new political value.

**Values.** In order to develop a value that allowed me to most directly tests the effects of social cues, I considered political constructs that meet the qualities we associate with political values: a potential for a split in public support for the two ends of the value and a strong belief among participants that the value is, indeed, a political value—i.e., that it refers to a “preferable mode of conduct or desirable end-state” (Feldman 2013, 603) or can “guide political decisions” (as it is worded to participants). Moreover, to avoid the pre-treatment effects explained previously, this new value must lack association with a political party. Following these standards, I developed a set of political concepts that could reasonably appear to experimental participants to be political values. Then, I conducted two pre-tests to consider individual perceptions of these political concepts. Both pre-tests relied on data from two samples recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) (*pre-test 1*  $N=500$ ; *pre-test 2*  $N=166$ ).

In pre-test 1, participants were asked to consider 10 different political constructs (all listed in *Appendix A*). Specifically, they were asked how much they support the construct, if they associate it with a political party (and if so which party), if they believe the idea is a “value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make,” and if they believe the idea is a “value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives.” Full question wording can be found in *Appendix A*. In pre-test 2, a different group of participants was asked to consider the same 10 constructs, but this time each construct was paired with its logical opposite and participants were asked if they thought these values were in opposition to each other (i.e., “if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other”) or if they were compatible (i.e., “that you can equally support and rely on both values”). The full question-wording and the full list of pairs participants considered can be found in *Appendix A*.

These pre-tests showed that the political constructs that appeared to participants to be political values were the opposing constructs of compromise versus standing your ground (from this point on, I call this value *compromise*, but it includes both ends—compromise versus standing your ground). The compromise value showed variance in opinion (compromise had a mean of 1.97 on a scale from 1 to 5, most to least support, while standing your ground had a mean of 2.21), had little association with a political party (60% said no for compromise and 48% for standing your ground), and, most importantly, the majority of participants believed this was a fundamental political value (80% said yes for compromise and 73% for standing your ground). Full data from these pre-tests can be found in *Appendix A*.

**Methods.** In order to consider the effect of social cues on reported values, I rely on participants recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk ( $N=400$ ).<sup>5</sup> Of these participants, half were randomized to take this study and the other half were randomized to take a study on morality. This randomization into two different studies left the compromise study with an  $N$  of 192.

The study proceeded as follows. First, participants answered a set of questions about demographics, typical media usage, political interest, and the like. Among these questions were three self-monitoring questions, where responses to these were then combined ( $\alpha=.66$ ) to create a 13-point self-monitoring scale (see Berinsky and Lavine 2012). Similar to its distribution in the population, the self-monitoring trait in this sample was skewed towards low self-monitoring, with a mean of 7.11 on a scale from 3 to 15 (recoded from low to high self-monitoring). Again, this trait was measured to better examine social influence—where I predict that social cues should influence the endorsement of values for high self-monitors (those whose goal it is to impress others), but they should not do so for low self-monitors (those who care more about presenting their authentic selves than impressing others).

Following their responses to these preliminary questions, participants were told, “People vary greatly on which value they believe in *compromise* (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) or *standing your ground* (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate).” Participants were then randomly assigned to either receive a social cue about these values (the treatment condition) or receive no such cue (the control condition). Since a key component of social influence is the desire to be like certain types of people—and avoid associations with other types of people—the social cue suggested to individuals the types of people who support compromise over standing your ground. In this particular case, the group was those who listen to news sources that support both political parties. The use of this social cue was pre-tested in the first preliminary Mturk study, where participants were asked how much they want to have in common with certain groups of people. Participants rated this group the highest, at 7.17 on a scale from 1 to 10 (from negative to positive).<sup>6</sup>

The main manipulation of this study (the information of which value this group supports) was embedded in the value question, where participants in the treatment group then read, “Interestingly, though, researchers have shown that those who listen to news sources that support both political parties tend to value *compromise* over *standing your ground*.” Participants in both conditions were then asked which end of the compromise value they support more—this was a

---

<sup>5</sup> The sample was 48% female, 79% white, 51% college graduate or above; and with a mean age of 38. It was 34% leaning, weak, or strong Republican, 13% pure Independent, and 53% leaning, weak, or strong Democrat. Similarly, the sample was slightly skewed liberal (with a mean of 3.66 on a scale from 1 to 7). The sample was above average in terms of interest in news (with a mean of 1.65 on a scale from 1 to 3), taking part in political discussions (with a mean of 2.68 on a scale from 0 to 7), and attention to news media (with a mean of 4.15 on scale from 0 to 7). Given this sample (like typical Mturk samples) is above average in terms of education, interest, discussions, and attention to media, pretreatment is especially threatening (see Druckman and Leeper 2012). This reinforces the decision to use new, rather than already-established, political values, as the latter would almost certainly threaten internal validity.

<sup>6</sup> Full question wording, list of other groups asked about, and results can be found in *Appendix A*.



zero-sum choice in that participants could not indicate support for both ends of the scale, and instead had to make a choice between compromise and standing your ground or say, “don’t know.”

**Results.** The prediction for this experiment is that the social cue will influence the endorsement of political values and that this effect will be moderated by the self-monitoring trait. Specifically, following theoretic expectations, high self-monitors—rather than low self-monitors—will follow the social cue and alter their endorsement of political values. That is, that for high self-monitors, the endorsement of compromise (the value noted in the social cue) will be higher in the treatment than in the control condition. Again, the treatment condition gives participants information that a certain (socially desirable) group supports compromise, and this should influence high self-monitors who want to be associated with positively-perceived groups and avoid association with negatively-perceived groups. Low self-monitors, when given this information, should *not* be influenced, as they care less about impressing others—i.e., being associated with socially desirable groups.

Before examining the moderating effects of self-monitoring, we can look at the effect of the social cue for all participants. Here we see that the social cue influences the endorsement of compromise at a marginally significant level ( $p=.091$ ). The effect of the social cue, though, is moderated by the self-monitoring trait. The self-monitoring scale can be considered in two ways: the scale can be split into two groups (Berinsky and Lavine 2012) or the scale can be used in its full form. I rely on both of these approaches—the former (the median split and two statistical tests) is represented in *Table 1* and *Figure 1*, and the latter (the continuous variable with marginal effects) can be found in *Appendix A*. These results support my theoretic expectations. In *Table 1* and *Figure 1*, we can see that when high self-monitors are given the social cue, they endorse compromise significantly more—29 percentage points more in fact ( $p=.0048$ ). For low self-monitors, though, they endorse compromise 1 percentage point *less*, although this is far from significant ( $p=.8530$ ). Further, the effect of the social cue for high self-monitors is statistically different from the effect of the social cue for low self-monitors ( $p=.026$ ; see *Appendix A*). Lastly, since the self-monitoring trait is measured rather than manipulated, I check if adding controls alters the results—it does not change the general findings. Essentially, the results show that the social cue influences the endorsement of compromise versus standing your ground, but *only* for high self-monitors—i.e., only for those whose goal it is to look good to others.

To also examine if high self-monitors then apply this new value to particular issues, I then asked participants about the January 2018 government shutdown—a political event that spoke quite serendipitously to the compromise value. After participants were asked about their value endorsements, they were then asked, “How do you feel about the recent government shutdown—do you think Democrats should have compromised with Republicans on the budget or was it better that they stood their ground?” If high self-monitors are not only altering their value endorsement, but also applying this new value to particular issues, we should see a similar trend as we saw before: greater belief that Democrats should have compromised with Republicans among high self-monitors in the cue condition than in the no cue condition. The results, which can be found in *Appendix A*, are insignificant but demonstrate the general trend seen in the main analysis.<sup>8</sup> When

---

<sup>7</sup> The question wording for the dependent variable was: “What about you—which do you believe in more?” with the options of compromise, standing your ground, or don’t know.


<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that the small sample size for these t-tests (with as little as 39 high self-monitors in the no cue condition) could be influencing the results of the significance tests.

given the information that a positively-perceived group endorses compromise, high self-monitors not only say they endorse compromise more, but they apply this new compromise value to a recent political issue—the government shutdown—by saying the Democrats should have compromised 15 percentage points more (although, again, this is not statistically significant).

*Table 1. Compromise Endorsement by Treatment, Self-Monitoring*

	Condition	Observations	Mean	SE	T-Statistic	P-Value
<i>All Participants</i>	No Cue	89	.55	.05	1.70	.0911
	Cue	103	.67	.05		
<i>High Self-Monitors</i>	No Cue	41	.49	.08	2.90	.0048
	Cue	45	.78	.06		
<i>Low Self-Monitors</i>	No Cue	48	.60	.07	0.19	.8530
	Cue	58	.59	.07		

*Figure 1. Compromise Endorsement by Treatment, Self-Monitoring*



**Discussion.** These results speak to an integral part of the theory—that people alter their political values because it is socially desirable to do—or, because it looks good to others. The effect of the social cue on high self-monitors supports this part of the theory. Again, when high self-monitors were told that a positively-viewed group endorses compromise, they endorsed compromise as well. Low self-monitors did not do so, as they do not desire being associated with particular groups—

they care about showing their authentic selves rather than impressing others. Further, the high self-monitors began to apply this new compromise value to a recent political issue—the January 2018 government shutdown (although this was not statistically significant). Overall, these findings give us causal evidence that social cues can influence people’s endorsements of political values.

The experimental evidence, though, is potentially narrow in that while it speaks quite well to internal validity, it cannot necessarily speak to external validity concerns (Shadish et al. 2002). To supplement the experiment, then, I turn to observational, nationally-representative (ANES) data with already-established political values (equality and morality). This analysis can thus speak to external validity questions about the subject population. Further, and perhaps more importantly, this set of analyses can confront the construct validity question about the particular political values used in the experiment. The experiment—to avoid pretreatment—used a new political value and in doing so increased internal validity but naturally sacrificed some construct validity.<sup>9</sup> This is also where the observational analysis complements the experiment.

## Observational Data

This set of analyses tests the second prediction, that political discussions will increase the congruence of one’s political values to their partisanship. The political values used in this set of analyses are equality and morality (see Goren 2005 for similar operationalization of political values).

**Methods.** Data are drawn from the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative data file. The set of analyses is restricted to 1986 to 2000, when the main independent variable (political discussions), dependent variables (political value endorsements and partisanship), and controls were measured.<sup>10</sup> As a reminder, in this analysis I use the political discussions variable as a proxy for the likelihood of receiving social cues about values. I thus predict that there will be a positive, significant effect of political discussions (*discuss*) on the congruence of one’s partisanship to their political values (*party value congruence*), suggesting that those who discuss politics with family and friends more often will endorse more socially desirable values (i.e., the values their party endorses).

**Measures.** The dependent variable in this set of analyses is *party value congruence* and it is comprised of the endorsement of two political values by party congruence: *equality* and *morality*.

---

<sup>9</sup> In general, research on political values that does not include *all* political values leads to the natural question of where political values differ from each other and if that matters. For example, the internalization of political values among the public likely differs by how clear social cues are, just as attitudes among the public differ depending on elite signaling (see Levendusky 2010).

<sup>10</sup> This includes 7 different years: 1986, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Not including knowledge in the controls allows for 9 different years (additionally: 2004 and 2008), and not including media in the controls allows for an extra year on top of that (2004, 2008, and 2012). Similarly, although the bivariate results have  $N=11,534$ , once adding controls the main model has  $N=4,621$ . Not including both knowledge and media allows for  $N=11,069$ , and including media but not including knowledge allows for  $N=7,217$ . Although these variables limit both the years and sample size, the results do not change when we remove these two variables.

Both values have two ends—a Democratic end (equality and moral tolerance) and a Republican end (inequality and moral traditionalism).<sup>11</sup> *Equality* is measured with six questions and *morality* with four, each having response options one to eight, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The full questions can be found in *Appendix B*, along with their basic descriptive statistics. These two variables—*equality* and *morality*—are then combined to create the main dependent variable—*party value congruence*—which ranges from 0 to 1, where higher scores indicate greater endorsement of one’s party’s values. For example, on the extremes, a 1 could indicate a Democrat who fully endorses *equality* and *moral tolerance*, or it could indicate a Republican who fully endorses *inequality* and *moral traditionalism*. Conversely, a 0 could indicate a Democrat who fully rejects *equality* and *moral tolerance* or a Republican who fully endorses both. Values between these two extremes show individuals with varying levels of value congruence. The Cronbach’s alpha for this variable is  $\alpha=.76$  and the information about its distribution (which is fairly normal) can be found in *Appendix B*.

The independent variable of interest is how often one discusses politics with friends and family. Again, this variable is used as a proxy for the likelihood one receives social cues about values. This implies, then, that the more often one engages in these political discussions—and thus the more one receives these social cues about value endorsements—the more she should align her political values in response to these cues and the more she should endorse socially desirable values (i.e., those that her party endorses). For example, if one is a Democrat, the more often she discusses politics with family and friends, the more she should receive social cues about socially desirable values and thus endorse equality and moral tolerance. Likewise, if one is a Republican, the more often she discusses politics with family and friends, the more she should receive social cues about socially desirable values and thus *reject* equality and moral tolerance.

This discussion variable is based on a question that asks individuals to indicate how many days per week they discuss politics with friends and family. For ease of coefficient comparison, the variable ranges from 0 to 1. Included in the model are controls that follow from previous political values research (e.g., Jacoby 2006, 2014) and include gender, age, income, race, education, ideology, and political knowledge (all coded from 0 to 1).<sup>12</sup> I also control for year (because the dataset is cumulative) and partisan strength, political interest, and media consumption in order to focus on the *specific* effect of political discussion. The coding of all control variables can be found in *Appendix B*. Since I predict that the more often one discusses politics the more congruent their values will be to their partisanship, we should see that *discuss* has a positive and significant effect on *party value congruence*.

---


<sup>11</sup> I discuss these political values and not the additional values from Jacoby (2006, 2014) and Goren et al. (2009) because these are the values available in the ANES dataset. Goren (2005) uses these same values, with one additional value: limited government. My analysis, however, does not make use of this value because it relies on only 3 questions each with only 2 response options (as a comparison, equality relies on 6 questions, each with 8 response options and morality relies on 4 questions, each with 8 response options). Further, adding the limited government questions would limit the analysis to only 3 years, rather than the 7 that we have by excluding it.

<sup>12</sup> Jacoby (2014) also includes two variables regarding religion (religious affiliation and religious commitment). I have added variables similar to these (church attendance and religion) in other models and see no difference in the effect of *discuss* (see *Appendix B*).

**Results.** Given the structure of the dependent variable, *party value congruence*, I estimate my models using ordinary least squares (OLS). The primary model ( $N=4,603$ ), which includes the aforementioned control variables as well as robust standard errors, is shown below.<sup>13</sup> This figure demonstrates that, as predicted, discussion has a significant ( $p<0.001$ ), positive effect on party value congruence. This means that people who spend more time discussing politics—and receive more social cues—have values that are more congruent to their party. These results suggest that, indeed, political values are socially transmitted.

It is important to look beyond statistical significance, however, and note the size of the effect of discussions on the congruence of one’s values to their party. The *discuss* coefficient in the main model is .027, implying that as one moves from never talking about politics to talking on a daily basis about politics with family and friends, they endorse their party’s political values roughly .027 points more (on a 0 to 1 scale). This may seem small, but if we compare the effect of *discuss* to other variables in the model (see *Figure 2*), we see that the strength of political discussions is quite similar to income, political interest, race, education, and partisan strength—variables that are believed to be important in political value endorsement (e.g., Ciuk 2016, 2017; Ciuk et al. 2017; Jacoby 2006; Jacoby 2014; Jacoby and Ciuk 2014).

Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Discuss on Party Value Congruence



<sup>13</sup> Robust standard errors are included to correct for possible heteroscedasticity. The model is also run without robust standard errors, though, and there is no difference in the effect of *discuss* (see *Appendix B*).

**Robustness Checks.** There are alternative explanations for these findings, though. One alternative explanation is that those who strongly believe in particular political values will both choose the congruent political party to join *and* be more inclined to have political discussions with family and friends. This explanation suggests a different causal relationship in which political value endorsement leads to increased discussion. A second alternative explanation is that the relationship between discussion and value endorsement is spurious—that strength of partisanship is moving both discussions and value endorsements. Both of these explanations undermine my theoretic expectations, suggesting that it is not social cues—as proxied here via the discussion variable—that are affecting reported value positions.

Although experimental findings address these alternative explanations by presenting a direct causal connection between social cue and value endorsement, I also attempt to address these with the observational data at hand. I cannot entirely dismiss these possibilities, but I *can* provide evidence that gives them less credence. To do so, I make use of the partisan strength variable. Both of the alternative explanation for the findings—1) that those who strongly believe in political values are then both choosing the congruent party and discussing politics more often, and 2) that partisan strength drives both value endorsement and discussion—would imply that the effect of the discussion variable should depend on partisan strength. That is, if those who strongly believe in political values are stronger partisans and also discuss politics more often, the effect of discussion should be more pronounced among the strong partisans than the weak partisans.

I test this possibility with an interaction between discussions and partisan strength, the assumption being that if the alternative explanations are true, then we would likely see a positive interaction between the strength of one's partisanship and how often one discusses politics (*strength \* discuss = party value congruence*). When looking at marginal effects, we do see that the effect of discuss is similar for weak and strong partisans (both  $p < .000$ ), but the confidence intervals become much larger for leaning partisans, making the marginal effect of discussions for leaning partisans insignificant ( $p = .122$ ). However, there is no significant *interaction* between discuss and partisan strength ( $p = .280$ ), suggesting that we can worry less about issues of endogeneity (see *Appendix B*). Again, this analysis does not directly address causal worries—the experimental analysis addresses these most directly. Jointly, though, these sets of analyses suggest a causal story from social cues to value endorsement.

Next, to consider the robustness of the estimates in the primary model, I estimate several additional models that alter the specifications of the primary model by eliminating fixed effects, clustering standard errors by year, including *both* fixed effects and clustered standard errors by year, removing robust standard errors, and including additional controls (church attendance, religion, occupation, racial resentment, political participation, and campaign attention). None of these changes alter the strength or direction of the *discuss* effect on *party value congruence*. These can be found in *Appendix B*, where I also include bivariate results which allow me to retain more observations given the larger sample size ( $N = 11,458$ ).

As another robustness check—to examine if one question in the dependent variable is driving the model—I rerun the primary model removing one question from the dependent variable at a time (see *Appendix B*). There is no change in the general results, which makes sense given the Cronbach's alpha level of these 10 value questions ( $\alpha = .76$ ). Finally, I rely on a different specification. Instead of using partisanship to create a value congruence variable, I remove partisanship from the dependent variable and predict simple *value endorsement*—a continuous variable from 0 to 1 where, at the extremes, 0 indicates endorsement of Republican values and 1

indicates endorsement of Democratic values. I then calculate the marginal effect of political discussions (again, as a proxy for social cues) based on partisanship—where discussions should have a positive and significant effect on *value endorsement* for Democrats but a negative and significant effect for Republicans, even after adding controls. This is indeed what I find, and these results can be found in *Appendix B*.

## Discussion

This piece aimed to test the theory that political values are the result of social influence. Specifically, I argued that people adopt the political values of those around them because it looks good to do so. I tested this with both experimental and observational data in attempts to address worries about various validities (see Shadish et al. 2002). In both methods, findings lend empirical support to the theory proposed in this piece. Specifically, leveraging individual differences in the self-monitoring trait and manipulating social cues, the experiment found that people do, in fact, adopt political values because it looks good to do so. Further, relying on the political discussion variable from ANES, the observational analyses implied that this adoption of values happens in the real world—that partisans adopt the political values of their co-partisans when they engage in political discussions, a forum that gives them the opportunity to both learn what their friends and family value, as well as be socially pressured to do the same. Essentially, these findings provide evidence of a social dimension to political values, thus giving doubt to the idea that political values can guide individuals through the complex and manipulative political world.

These results have some limitations, though, which I will attempt to address briefly here. I also note that this piece does not claim to address every question about the nature of political values—there are still empirical and theoretical questions for future research that were simply beyond the scope of this research. First, a critic might wonder where political independents fit in. The theory does not exclude pure independents and nor does the experiment. However, the observational analysis removes pure independents (it does not remove leaning independents, though). This is simply an artifact of the analysis that I use, rather than a reflection of the theory. I do presume that pure independents follow social cues in a manner similar to leaning, weak, and strong partisans, as research in this area suggests this to be the case (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). Future research should examine this.

A second limitation may be conflicting environments. For example, what about a Democrat who also is a churchgoer—this person would likely receive social cues from their Democratic environment to value moral tolerance, but also receive social cues from their church environment to value moral *traditionalism*. Which do they respond to? While neither the theory nor the main set of analyses address this segment of the population, I recommend future research do so. For this future research, I would theorize that in these types of heterogeneous environments—where people receive competing social cues—individuals are actually the *most* stable in their values (i.e., the *least* influenced by their environment). Essentially, I would theorize that the social cues cancel each other out, just as competing frames cancel out framing effects (see Chong and Druckman 2007). I briefly empirically address this with the observational ANES data and find suggestive evidence that this could be the case (see *Appendix C*).

Lastly, one might ask if this theory and research suggest that political values are norms internalized by Democrats and Republicans. I briefly examine this possibility with survey questions at the end of the experiment asking partisans if they would be disappointed in their own

partisans for not valuing their party's values and comparing this to how they would feel towards opposing partisans not valuing that value. I find suggestive evidence that while equality may be a norm in the Democratic culture, self-reliance may not be a norm in the Republican culture. This gives us some insight about *why* people would alter their values to fit in with others—Democrats, at least, punish in-group members for not adhering to their group's equality values. See *Appendix C* for this analysis and discussion.

## Conclusion

This research carries a number of consequences for research and the conceptualization of political values. As Seligman and Katz (1996) aptly note, “If value or value types do reorder themselves across situations, then we must ask what purpose the general value system serves.” Indeed, research relies on the notion that constructs are correctly defined and operationalized—doubts to the contrary should be given attention, especially if those constructs are as widely used as political values (see Caprara and Vecchione 2013 for review).

Beyond the implications of these findings for research in political science, though, these findings have consequences for the practice of politics. First, the findings speak to how well individuals can reason through politics—if they can work their way through outside influence from elites, the media, and the social world to make reasonably independent decisions. Remember, if the populous does not hold stable values that guide their political decisions, the government will have trouble translating majority preferences into policies (Valentino and Nardis 2013). Unquestionably, this mitigates the effectiveness of any democratic government and lends doubt to the optimistic possibility that values can guide individuals through new political decisions, even in the face of outside influence. Further, these findings give us some insight into the causes of ideological polarization. While some have claimed ideological polarization to be the result of a “culture war,” or a direct competition of political values (e.g., Berlin 1969; Chong 2000; Jacoby 2014; Stone 2012), my findings suggest that some of the ideological polarization is the result of homophily and social interactions—i.e., social polarization (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason 2015)—where social polarization leads to increased ideological polarization.

Of course, there are possibilities that could suggest these results are not so severe to the practice of politics. It may be possible, for example, that while political values are not our political guides, other considerations can lead individuals through politics and prevent manipulation by elites, the media, and social influence. It is even possible that we have *political values* that are these considerations, but that the political values we have been measuring are not them (i.e., political scientists have been measuring a different construct and there are other latent political values that we are not measuring). This manuscript, though, is responding to research on political values *as we know them*, rather than attempting to measure a new latent concept—it cannot speak to whether there are political values that we have not “discovered” yet. In essence, these possibilities question the construct validity of our research on political values, and it is one that we have dealt with for decades. As Converse (1964) explains, “Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification.” I should note, in closing, that even if either of these possibilities were the case, while the practice of politics would be saved, research relying on political values would remain precarious.



## References

- Bartels, Larry M. 2003. "Democracy with Attitudes," in *Electoral Democracy*, eds. Michael Bruce MacKuen and George Rabinowitz. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Berinsky, Adam J. 1999. "The Two Faces of Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science*: 1209-1230.
- Berinsky, Adam J. 2002. "Political Context and Survey Response: The Dynamics of Racial Policy Opinion." *The Journal of Politics* 64(2): 567-584.
- Berinsky, Adam J. 2004. "Can We Talk? Self-Presentation and the Survey Response." *Political Psychology* 25(4): 643-659.
- Berinsky, Adam J. and Howard Lavine. 2012. "Self-Monitoring and Political Attitudes." *Improving Public Opinion Surveys: Interdisciplinary Innovation and the American National Election Studies*: 27-45.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and W. E. Miller. 1954. *The Voter Decides*. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson.
- Caprara, Gian Vittorio and Michele Vecchione. 2013. "Personality Approaches to Political Behavior." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. Oxford University Press.
- Carlson, Taylor N., and Jaime E. Settle. 2016. "Political Chameleons: An Exploration of Conformity in Political Discussions." *Political Behavior* 38: 817-859.
- Chong, Dennis. 2000. *Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. "Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 637-655.
- Ciuk, David J. 2016. "Americans' Value Preferences Pre- and Post-9/11." *Social Science Quarterly* 97: 407-417.
- Ciuk, David J. 2017. "Democratic Values? A Racial Group-Based Analysis of Core Political Values, Partisanship, and Ideology." *Political Behavior* 39: 479-501.
- Ciuk, David J., Robert N. Lupton, and Judd R. Thornton. "Value Voters: The Conditional Effect of Income on the Relationship between Core Values and Political Attitudes and Behavior." *Political Psychology*, forthcoming.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, edited by David Apter. New York: Free Press.
- Cosmides, Leda, and John Tooby. 1992. "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange." *The Adapted Mind*: 163-228.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Bros.
- Druckman, James N., and Thomas J. Leeper. 2012. "Learning More from Political Communication Experiments: Pretreatment and Its Effects." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(4): 875-896.
- Evans, Geoffrey, and Anja Neundorff. 2018. "Core Political Values and the Long-Term Shaping of Partisanship in the British Electorate." *Accepted in the British Journal of Political Science*.
- Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science*: 416-440.

- Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 24(1): 41-74.
- Feldman, Stanley. 2013. "Political Ideology." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. Oxford University Press.
- Feldman, Stanley, and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2001. "The Humanitarian Foundation of Public Support for Social Welfare." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 658-677.
- Gangestad, Steven W., and Mark Snyder. 2000. "Self-Monitoring: Appraisal and Reappraisal." *Psychological Bulletin* 126(4): 530-555.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." *The American Political Science Review* 94(3): 653-663.
- Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment." *The American Political Science Review* 102(1): 33-48.
- Goffman, Erving. 1967. "On Face-Work." *Interaction Ritual*: 5-45.
- Goren, Paul. 2005. "Party Identification and Core Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 881-896.
- Goren, Paul, Christopher M. Federico, and Miki Caul Kittilson. 2009. "Source Cues, Partisan Identities, and Political Value Expression." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 805-820.
- Holtgraves, Thomas. 1992. "The Linguistic Realization of Face Management: Implications for Language Production and Comprehension, Person Perception, and Cross-Cultural Communication." *Social Psychology Quarterly*: 141-159.
- Huddy, Leonie, Joshua Billig, John Bracciodieta, Lois Hoeffler, Patrick J. Moynihan, Patricia Pugliani. 1997. "The Effect of Interviewer Gender on the Survey Response." *Political Behavior* 19(3): 197-220.
- Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *The American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1099-1120.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood. 2015. "Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 690-707.
- Jacoby, William G. 2006. "Value Choices and American Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 706-723.
- Jacoby, William G. 2014. "Is There a Culture War? Conflicting Value Structures in American Public Opinion." *The American Political Science Review* 108(4): 754-771.
- Jacoby, William G., and David J. Ciuk. 2014. "Individual Value Choices: Orderly Structure Versus Ambivalence and Indifference." Working Paper.
- Kam, Cindy D. 2005. "Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences." *Political Behavior* 27(2): 163-182.
- Klar, Samara. 2014. "Partisanship in a Social Setting." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3): 687-704.
- Klar, Samara, and Yanna Krupnikov. 2016. *Independent Politics: How American Disdain for Parties Leads to Political Inaction*.
- Knutsen, Oddbjorn. 1995. "Party Choice," in *The Impact of Values*, ed. Jan W. Van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough. New York: Oxford University Press, 460-491.
- Kuklinski, James H. 2001. *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*. Cambridge University Press.

- Kuklinski, James H., Michael D. Cobb, and Martin Gilens. 1997. "Racial Attitudes and the 'New South'." *The Journal of Politics* 59(2): 323-349.
- Kuran, Timur. 1997. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Harvard University Press.
- Lavine, Howard, and Mark Snyder. 1996. "Cognitive Processes and the Functional Matching Effect in Persuasion: The Mediating Role of Subjective Perceptions of Message Quality." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 32(6): 580-604.
- Levendusky, Matthew. 2010. "Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization." *Political Behavior* 32(1): 111-131.
- Mason, Lilliana. 2015. "'I Disrespectfully Agree': The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 128-145.
- McCann, James A. 1997. "Electoral Choices and Core Value Change: The 1992 Presidential Campaign." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(2): 564-583.
- Mutz, Diana C. 1998. *Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nelson, Thomas E., and Jennifer Garst. 2005. "Values-Based Political Messages and Persuasion: Relationships among Speaker, Recipient, and Evoked Values." *Political Psychology* 26(4): 489-515.
- Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley. 1997. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *The American Political Science Review* 91(3): 567-583.
- Panagopolous, Costas. 2014. "I've Got My Eyes on You: Implicit Social-Pressure Cues and Prosocial Behavior." *Political Psychology* 35(1): 23-33.
- Petersen, Michael Bang. 2015. "Evolutionary Political Psychology"
- Rokeach, Milton. 1968. *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Rokeach, Milton. 1973. *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: Free Press.
- Rokeach, Milton. 1979. "Some Unresolved Issues in Theories of Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values." *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*. University of Nebraska Press.
- Schwartz, Shalom H. and Wolfgang Bilsky. 1987. "Toward a Universal Psychological Structure of Human Values." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53(3): 550-562.
- Schwartz, Shalom H., Gian Vittorio Caprara, and Michele Vecchione. 2010. "Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Study." *Political Psychology* 31: 421-452.
- Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell. 2002. *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Seligman, Clive, and Albert N. Katz. 1996. "The Dynamics of Value Systems." In *The Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium, Volume 8*, edited by Clive Seligman, James M. Olson, and Mark P. Zanna. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Sean M. Theriault. 2004. "The Structure of Political Argument and the Logic of Issue Framing." In *Studies in Public Opinion*, eds. Willem E. Saris and Paul M. Sniderman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 133-165.
- Stone, Deborah. 2012. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision-Making (Third Edition)*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

- Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. "When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring." *American Journal of Political Science*: 1032-1053.
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." *Science* 211(4481): 453-458.
- Valentino, Nicholas A. and Yioryos Nardis. 2013. "Political Communication: Form and Consequence of the Information Environment." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. Oxford University Press.
- Weber, Christopher R., Howard Lavine, Leonie Huddy, and Christopher M. Federico. 2014. "Placing Racial Stereotypes in Context: Social Desirability and the Politics of Racial Hostility." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1): 63-78
- Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zaller, John, and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science*: 579- 616.

## Appendix A: Experimental Data

### *Preliminary Data Participant Descriptives.*

#### Sample 1

62% female; 80% white; 60% college graduate or above; mean age 37; 32% Republican (leaning, weak, and strong), 27% Independent, 41% Democrat (leaning, weak, and strong); ideology mean of 3.09 (scale of 1 to 6); interest mean of 2.49 (scale of 1 to 6).

#### Sample 2

48% female; 72% white; 55% college graduate or above; mean age 37; 28% Republican (leaning, weak, and strong), 14% Independent (pure), 58% Democrat; ideology mean of 3.41 (scale of 1 to 7); interest mean of 1.72 (scale of 1 to 3).

### *Preliminary Data 1 Question Wording.*

We are seeking to understand people's values. In the next section, different values will be listed, along with their definitions, and you will be asked how much you support them.

[The following questions were shown to respondents in random order]

1. Freedom of expression (that is, allowing everyone to speak their mind, even if their views are offensive, unpopular, or denigrate certain people and/or groups)
  - How much do you support freedom of expression? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
  - Do you associate freedom of expression with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
  - Do you believe freedom of expression is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
  - Do you believe freedom of expression is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]
2. Protection from hurtful speech (that is, protecting people from offensive, hurtful, and denigrating speech, even if that means not allowing others to speak freely)
  - How much do you support protection from hurtful speech? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
  - Do you associate protection from hurtful speech with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
  - Do you believe protection from hurtful speech is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
  - Do you believe protection from hurtful speech is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types

- of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]
3. Complete transparency (that is, always being honest and transparent, even if the consequences of doing so may lead to negative consequences, such as people getting hurt)
    - How much do you support complete transparency? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
    - Do you associate complete transparency with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
    - Do you believe complete transparency is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
    - Do you believe complete transparency is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]
  4. Kind dishonesty (that is, not being completely truthful when it might threaten or hurt others)
    - How much do you support kind dishonesty? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
    - Do you associate kind dishonesty with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
    - Do you believe kind dishonesty is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
    - Do you believe kind dishonesty is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]
  5. Unconditional material support for others (that is, helping others who are less fortunate, without regard for whether some of their misfortune is their own fault)
    - How much do you support unconditional material support for others? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
    - Do you associate unconditional material support for others with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
    - Do you believe unconditional material support for others is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
    - Do you believe unconditional material support for others is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]
  6. “Teaching a man to fish” (that is, giving people skills to help themselves, without providing them with material help)

- How much do you support “teaching a man to fish”? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
  - Do you associate “teaching a man to fish” with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
  - Do you believe “teaching a man to fish” is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don’t know]
  - Do you believe “teaching a man to fish” is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don’t know]
7. Compromise (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate)
- How much do you support compromise? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
  - Do you associate compromise with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
  - Do you believe compromise is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don’t know]
  - Do you believe compromise is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don’t know]
8. Standing your ground (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate)
- How much do you support standing your ground? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
  - Do you associate standing your ground with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
  - Do you believe standing your ground is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don’t know]
  - Do you believe standing your ground is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don’t know]
9. Retaliation (that is, treating those who have wronged you with the deserved equally negative treatment)
- How much do you support retaliation? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
  - Do you associate retaliation with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]

- Do you believe retaliation is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
  - Do you believe retaliation is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]
10. Responding to injury without revenge (that is, even if you have been wronged, treating everyone positively and with respect)
- How much do you support responding to injury without revenge? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
  - Do you associate responding to injury without revenge with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
  - Do you believe responding to injury without revenge is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
  - Do you believe responding to injury without revenge is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]

The last set of questions asks you about various groups of people and how you feel towards them.

[the following options are listed in random order]

11. How much would you want to have in common with the following types of people? [1-10, with 1 being I would not want to have anything in common with this group, and 10 being I would want to have most things in common with this group]
- a. People who support President Donald Trump [1-10]
  - b. People who oppose President Donald Trump [1-10]
  - c. People who think Donald Trump is doing a good job as President [1-10]
  - d. People who think Donald Trump is doing a poor job as President [1-10]
  - e. People who listen to news sources that support both parties [1-10]
  - f. People who are loyal to their party [1-10]
  - g. People who are political independents [1-10]
  - h. People who are political moderates [1-10]
  - i. People who know a lot about politics [1-10]

***Preliminary Data 1 Results.***

[From most ideal to least ideal]

1. How much do Mturk participants support these hypothetical values (1-5, 1 meaning most support)—mean, sd?
  - a. Protection from hurtful speech—3.18, 1.39
  - b. Kind dishonesty—3.19, 1.18
  - c. Material support—2.38, 1.22
  - d. Retaliation—3.76, 1.11



- e. Standing your ground—2.21, 1.12
  - f. No revenge—2.02, 1.13
  - g. Compromise—1.97, 0.93
  - h. Teaching a man to fish—1.72, 0.96
  - i. Complete transparency—1.72, 0.89
  - j. Freedom of expression—1.48, 0.76
2. Do participants associate these hypothetical values with political parties (% no party)?
- a. Complete transparency (82%)
  - b. Kind dishonesty (76%)
  - c. Revenge (63%)
  - d. Compromise (60%)
  - e. Retaliation (52%)
  - f. Freedom of expression (51%)
  - g. Teaching a man to fish (50%)
  - h. Standing your ground (48%)
  - i. Protection from hurtful speech (46%)
  - j. Material support (40%)
3. Do participants see these hypothetical values as potential political values?
- a. Compromise (80%)
  - b. Freedom of expression (73%)
  - c. Standing your ground (73%)
  - d. Complete transparency (63%)
  - e. Material support (62%)
  - f. Teaching a man to fish (60%)
  - g. Retaliation (55%)
  - h. Revenge (53%)
  - i. Protection from hurtful speech (52%)
  - j. Kind dishonesty (33%)
4. Do participants see these hypothetical values as potential general values?
- a. Compromise (86%)
  - b. Freedom of expression (80%)
  - c. Teaching a man to fish (77%)
  - d. Complete transparency (76%)
  - e. Standing your ground (76%)
  - f. Revenge (74%)
  - g. Material support (71%)
  - h. Retaliation (67%)
  - i. Kind dishonesty (64%)
  - j. Protection from hurtful speech (63%)

Attitudes Towards Groups, 1-10 from negative to positive

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
<i>Trump supporters</i>	4.28	3.20
<i>Trump opponents</i>	6.28	3.21
<i>Trump good job</i>	4.19	3.15
<i>Trump poor job</i>	6.40	3.18

<i>Balanced news</i>	7.17	2.38
<i>Party Loyal</i>	5.37	2.38
<i>Independent</i>	6.61	2.30
<i>Moderate</i>	6.43	2.35
<i>Knowledgeable</i>	6.57	2.31

### ***Preliminary Data 2 Question Wording.***

Next, you will be asked to consider whether certain values are compatible.

1. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
  - Freedom of expression (that is, allowing everyone to speak their mind, even if their views are offensive, unpopular, or denigrate certain people and groups) and Protection from hurtful speech (that is, protecting people from offensive, hurtful and denigrating speech, even if that means not allowing others to speak freely)
    - [if yes]: which value do you support more [freedom of expression, protection from hurtful speech]
2. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
  - Complete transparency (that is, always being honest and transparent, even if the consequences of doing so may lead to negative consequences, such as people getting hurt) and Kind dishonesty (that is, not being completely truthful when it might threaten or hurt others)
    - [if yes]: which value do you support more [complete transparency, kind dishonesty]
3. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
  - Unconditional material support for others (that is, helping others who are less fortunate, without regard for whether some of their misfortune is their own fault) and “Teaching a man to fish” (that is, giving people skills to help themselves, without providing them with material help)
    - [if yes]: which value do you support more [unconditional material support for others, “teaching a man to fish”]
4. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]

- Compromise (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) and Standing your ground (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate)
    - [if yes]: which value do you support more [compromise, standing your ground]
5. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
- Retaliation (that is, treating those who have wronged you with the deserved equally negative treatment) and Responding to injury without revenge (that is, even if you have been wronged, treating everyone positively and with respect)
    - [if yes]: which value do you support more [retaliation, responding to injury without revenge]

***Preliminary Data 2 Results.***

<b>Pairs</b>	<b>Opposed?</b>	<b>(%)</b>	<b>Choice</b>	<b>(%)</b>
<b>Speech</b>	<i>Opposed</i>	70.55	<i>Freedom Speech</i>	78.64
	<i>Compatible</i>	29.45	<i>Protection</i>	21.36
<b>Honesty</b>	<i>Opposed</i>	76.35	<i>Transparency</i>	74.34
	<i>Compatible</i>	23.65	<i>Honesty</i>	25.66
<b>Support</b>	<i>Opposed</i>	48.92	<i>Support</i>	29.41
	<i>Compatible</i>	51.08	<i>Teaching</i>	70.59
<b>Compromise</b>	<i>Opposed</i>	78.62	<i>Compromise</i>	70.18
	<i>Compatible</i>	21.38	<i>Standing Ground</i>	29.82
<b>Revenge</b>	<i>Opposed</i>	83.45	<i>Retaliation</i>	19.17
	<i>Compatible</i>	16.55	<i>No Revenge</i>	80.83

***Experiment Question Wording.***

**[Pretreatment Questions]**

1. [pid] Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? [Republican, Democrat, Independent, other, don't know]
  - a. 1a. If 1 or 2: Would you call yourself a strong [Republican / Democrat] or a not very strong [Republican / Democrat]? [strong, not strong]
  - b. 1b. If 3 or 4 or 5: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party? [Republican, Democrat, neither]
2. [ideology] We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? [extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate, middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely conservative, don't know/haven't thought much about it]
3. [attention] Some people don't pay much attention to political news. How about you? Would you say that you are very much interested, somewhat interested, or not interested at all in political news? [very much interested/somewhat interested/not interested at all]

4. [discuss] How many days in the past week did you talk about politics with your family or friends? [never, one day a week, two days a week, three days a week, four days a week, five days a week, six days a week, seven days a week]
5. [media] How many days in the past week did you watch political news on television, read about politics in a newspaper (either online or in print), and/or listen to politics on the radio? [never, one day a week, two days a week, three days a week, four days a week, five days a week, six days a week, seven days a week]
6. [gender] What is your gender? [male, female]
7. [age] What is your age? [\_\_]
8. [race] What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? [white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, other]
9. [education] What is the highest level of education that you have completed? [did not complete a high school degree, high school degree, some college, Associate's degree, Bachelor's degree, graduate or professional degree]
10. [self-monitoring 1] When you are with other people, how often do you put on a show to impress or entertain them? [always, most of the time, some of the time, once in a while, never]
11. [self-monitoring 2] When you are in a group of people, how often are you the center of attention? [always, most of the time, some of the time, once in a while, never]
12. [self-monitoring 3] How good or poor of an actor would you be? [excellent, good, fair, poor, very poor]

[Treatment: RA to no cue or cue condition]

[No Cue Condition]

People vary greatly on which value they believe in: *compromise* (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) or *standing your ground* (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate). What about you—which do you believe in more? [compromise/standing your ground/don't know]

[Cue Condition]

People vary greatly on which value they believe in: *compromise* (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) or *standing your ground* (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate). Interestingly, though, researchers have shown that those who listen to news sources that support both political parties tend to value *compromise* over *standing your ground*. What about you—which do you believe in more? [compromise/standing your ground/don't know]

5. [issue outcome] How do you feel about the recent government shutdown—do you think Democrats should have compromised with Republicans on the budget or was it better that they stood their ground? [they should have compromised/they were right to stand their ground/don't know]

[questions presented in random order]

1. [values as norms 1] How do you feel when a Republican does not value self-reliance (that is, believing that our country would be much better off if there were more emphasis on determination, perseverance, and hard work)? [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other\_\_\_\_]

2. [values as norms 2] How do you feel when a Democrat does not value self-reliance (that is, believing that our country would be much better off if there were more emphasis on determination, perseverance, and hard work)? [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other\_\_\_\_\_]
3. [values as norms 3] How do you feel when a Republican does not value equality? (that is, making sure that everyone has the same chance to get ahead in life) [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other\_\_\_\_\_]
4. [values as norms 4] How do you feel when a Democrat does not value equality? (that is, making sure that everyone has the same chance to get ahead in life) [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other\_\_\_\_\_]
5. Please leave any comments you have about this study: [\_\_\_\_\_]

***Does the Effect of Social Cue Differ for Low and High Self-Monitors?*** This table examines if the effect of the social cue (statistically) differs depending on if one is a low or high self-monitor. The logit includes the treatment dummy variable, the self-monitoring dummy variable (split at the median), and an interaction between these two terms and I conduct odds ratios for ease of interpretation. The results show that when we move from low to high self-monitoring, the odds of the social cue influencing value endorsement increases by almost four-fold. This change is statistically significant at conventional levels ( $p < .05$ ).

*Effect of Social Cue by Low and High Self-Monitors*


	Odds Ratio	Standard Error	Z-Statistic	P-Value
<i>Treatment</i>	0.93	.40	0.19	.851
<i>Self-Monitoring</i>	0.62	.43	1.10	.272
<i>Treat*SM</i>	3.96	.62	2.22	.026
<i>Constant</i>	1.53	.29	1.43	.152

***Marginal Effects with Continuous Self-Monitoring Variable.*** Below, we can see that the effect of the social cue monotonically increases as self-monitoring increases.<sup>14</sup> It does not become positive and significant until the self-monitoring trait is at least equal to 8 (on a scale from 3 to 15, from low to high self-monitors). Again, this supports the first prediction, demonstrating that those who change their behavior in response to social pressure—those whose goal it is to look good to others (i.e., high self-monitors)—alter their value endorsements in response to social cues when those social cues indicate it is desirable to do so.

*Marginal Effect of Social Cue on Value Endorsement by Self-Monitoring Behavior*

---

<sup>14</sup> The marginal effects plot is based on a logit regression predicting endorsement of compromise (as opposed to standing your ground) by an interaction between the treatment and a continuous measure of self-monitoring. Considering the self-monitoring trait is measured rather than manipulated, I also run the same model with controls (partisanship, ideology, education, race, age, gender, media usage, partaking in political discussions, and interest in politics). I find the same results.




**Issue Results.** We see that high self-monitors change their value endorsements when given a social cue to do so. Do they then apply this new value to particular issues? That is, are they changing their endorsement of the value and then even integrating it into their particular beliefs? To examine this, I also asked participants about the January 2018 government shutdown—a political event that spoke quite serendipitously to the compromise value. After participants were asked about their value endorsements, they were then asked, “How do you feel about the recent government shutdown—do you think Democrats should have compromised with Republicans on the budget or was it better that they stood their ground?” If high self-monitors are not only altering their value endorsement, but also applying this new value to particular issues, we should see a similar trend as we saw above: greater belief that Democrats should have compromised with Republicans among high self-monitors in the cue condition than in the no cue condition.

These results are shown. Although not significant, we see the general trend replicate. When given the information that a positively-perceived group endorses compromise, high self-monitors not only say they endorse compromise more, but they apply this new compromise value to a recent political issue—the government shutdown—by saying the Democrats should have compromised 15 percentage points more (although, again, this is not statistically significant). Further, it seems that low self-monitors backlash against the social cue—we see a slight *decrease* of 9 percentage points in the cue condition (again, this is not significant). Keep in mind, though, the small sample size for these t-tests (with as little as 39 high self-monitors in the no cue condition)—this lack of statistical power could certainly be influencing the results of the significance tests.


*Applying Compromise to Issue by Treatment, Self-Monitoring*

	<i>Condition</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>T-Statistic</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
<i>High Self-Monitors</i>	No Cue	39	.41	.08	1.35	.1820
	Cue	41	.56	.08		
<i>Low Self-Monitors</i>	No Cue	43	.60	.08	0.93	.3561
	Cue	53	.51	.07		

*Applying Compromise to Issue by Treatment, Self-Monitoring*



*Marginal Effect of Social Cue on Issue by Self-Monitoring Behavior*



## Appendix B: ANES Data

**Measures.** *Equality* is operationalized with six questions with response options one to eight, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. These questions are: (1) “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed” (reverse coded); (2) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country”; (3) “One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance” (reverse coded); (4) “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others”; (5) “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are”; (6) and “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems” (reverse coded).

*Morality* is operationalized with four questions with response options one to eight from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Note that this variable is composed of Goren’s (2005) *moral tolerance* and *moral traditionalism* variable (i.e., both operationalizations are included but grouped into one variable). These questions were: (1) “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society”; (2) “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes” (reverse coded); (3) “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties”; and (4) “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own” (reverse coded).

**Controls:** *year* (1986 to 2000, two-year intervals), *gender* (dummy, 0=female, 1=male), *age* (continuous, recoded 0 to 1), *income* (five-scale ordinal, recoded 0 to 1), *black* (dummy,




0=non-black, 1=black), *Hispanic* (dummy, 0=non-Hispanic, 1=Hispanic), *education* (four-scale ordinal, recoded 0 to 1), *ideology* (seven-scale ordinal, higher values=more conservative, recoded 0 to 1), *partisan strength* (four-scale ordinal, higher values=stronger partisanship, recoded 0 to 1), *political interest* (three-scale ordinal, higher values=more interested, recoded 0 to 1), *media consumption* (0-14, sum of *TV news* and *print news*—both 0 to 7, indicating the number of days watching or reading news, recoded 0 to 1), and *political knowledge* (0=low knowledge, 1=high knowledge).

***Value Endorsement Descriptive Statistics (scale: 1-5).***

Question	Observations	Mean	SD
Equality 1	14,375	4.28	1.02
Equality 2	15,315	3.04	1.38
Equality 3	14,352	3.21	1.31
Equality 4	14,380	3.36	1.22
Equality 5	14,380	2.98	1.35
Equality 6	15,284	3.63	1.21
Morality 1	13,975	2.31	1.23
Morality 2	13,968	2.82	1.41
Morality 3	13,975	1.94	1.10
Morality 4	13,948	3.47	1.22

***Party Value Congruence Variable (Dependent Variable) Distribution***



**Primary OLS Models.** Given the structure of the dependent variable, party value congruence, I estimate my models using ordinary least squares (OLS). The first model (*model 1*,  $N=4,603$ ) is shown below. This table demonstrates that discussion has a significant ( $p<0.001$ ), positive effect on value congruence. To consider the robustness of the estimates in model 1, I estimate several additional models that alter the specifications of model 1 by eliminating fixed effects (*model 2*,  $N=4,603$ ) and clustering the standard errors by year (*model 3*,  $N=4,603$ ). In addition, I also include the results from a bivariate model, which allows me to retain more observations for a larger sample size (*model 4*,  $N=11,458$ ).

*OLS Models Predicting Congruent Value Endorsement*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
discuss	0.0270 (0.00682)	0.0262 (0.00654)	0.0262 (0.00760)	0.0377 (0.00446)
1990	0.00477 (0.00855)	-	-	-
1992	0.0195 (0.00712)	-	-	-
1994	0.0242 (0.00675)	-	-	-
1996	0.0337 (0.00667)	-	-	-
1998	-0.0221 (0.00899)	-	-	-
2000	0.00635 (0.0102)	-	-	-
male	-0.00363 (0.00438)	-0.00326 (0.00439)	-0.00326 (0.00561)	-
age	-0.0338 (0.0149)	-0.0313 (0.0148)	-0.0313 (0.0375)	-
income	-0.0360 (0.0116)	-0.0375 (0.0116)	-0.0375 (0.00920)	-
black	0.0564 (0.00840)	0.0542 (0.00869)	0.0542 (0.0255)	-
Hispanic	0.00712 (0.00957)	0.00685 (0.00975)	0.00685 (0.0155)	-
education	0.0565 (0.0106)	0.0558 (0.0104)	0.0558 (0.00757)	-
ideology	-0.182 (0.0114)	-0.180 (0.0115)	-0.180 (0.0665)	-
strength	0.0712 (0.0113)	0.0718 (0.0113)	0.0718 (0.00806)	-
interest	0.0539 (0.0103)	0.0633 (0.0103)	0.0633 (0.00478)	-
media	-0.0181 (0.00828)	-0.0240 (0.00797)	-0.0240 (0.00922)	-
know	0.0138	0.0162	0.0162	-

	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.00938)	-
Constant	0.554	0.560	0.560	0.565
	(0.0179)	(0.0178)	(0.0279)	(0.00201)
Observations	4,621	4,621	4,621	11,534
R-squared	0.119	0.107	0.107	0.006

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**Addressing Endogeneity Concerns with Observational Data.** Based on the same OLS models with the same controls (*year, gender, age, income, black, Hispanic, education, ideology, partisan strength, political interest, media consumption, and political knowledge*) and robust standard errors as in the primary model, this set of analyses examine the interaction between discussion and partisan strength, dropping pure independents since they are not included in the dependent variable measure. Strength: 1=leaner, 2=weak partisan, 3=strong partisan. There is no significant interaction with partisan strength ( $p=.2.80$ ), and this is shown visually in the following table and figure.


*OLS Models with Partisan Strength\*Discuss Interaction*

	Model
1990	0.00551 (0.00850)
1992	0.0192 (0.00711)
1994	0.0235 (0.00677)
1996	0.0329 (0.00667)
1998	-0.0230 (0.00900)
2000	0.00616 (0.0102)
male	-0.00314 (0.00437)
age	-0.0340 (0.0149)
income	-0.0363 (0.0116)
black	0.0566 (0.00841)
Hispanic	0.00722 (0.00959)
education	0.0567 (0.0106)
ideology	-0.183 (0.0113)
interest	0.0541 (0.0103)

media	-0.0183 (0.00829)
know	0.0139 (0.0158)
discuss	0.00957 (0.0184)
strength	0.0144 (0.00412)
strength*discuss	0.00837 (0.00774)
Constant	0.580 (0.0179)
Observations	4,603
R-squared	0.120

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*Marginal Effect of Discuss on Value Congruence by Partisan Strength*



**Adding Further Controls and Robustness Checks.** *Model 1* ( $n=3,650$ ), below, controls for *church attendance* (0=never, 1=few times a year, 2=once or twice a month, 3=almost every week, 4=once a week, 5=more than once a week, recoded 0 to 1) and *model 2* ( $n=4,603$ ) controls for *Protestant* (1=Protestant, 0=Catholic/Jewish/other/none), *Catholic* (1=Catholic, 0=Protestant/Jewish/other/none), and *Jewish* (1=Jewish, 0=Protestant/Catholic/other/none).

*Model 3* ( $n=4,603$ ) controls for *occupation* (1=professional or managerial, 2=clerical or sales, 3=skilled, semi-skilled, or service, 4=laborers except farm, 5=farm, forestry, fisherman, 6=homemakers, reference=NA/no occupation/armed services, recoded 0 to 1). *Model 4* ( $n=3,351$ ) controls for *racial resentment* (1-20, higher values=more resentment, recoded 0 to 1), *model 5* ( $n=4,603$ ) controls for *political participation* (1-6, higher values=more participation, recoded 0 to 1), and *model 6* ( $n=1,666$ ) controls for *campaign attention* (1=no media, 2=1 media, 3=2 media, 4=3 media, 5=all four media—TV, radio, articles, internet, recoded 0 to 1).

All models include robust standard errors as well as the controls from the primary model (*year, gender, age, income, black, Hispanic, education, ideology, partisan strength, political interest, media consumption, and political knowledge*). The controls were added separately, rather than all together in one model, because all controls decrease the sample size immensely ( $n=886$ ), although *discuss* remains marginally significant even with this extremely reduced sample size at  $p=.084$  (shown in the second table, *Model 1*). In this table as well, *Model 2* shows the primary model without robust standard errors, and *Model 3* shows the primary model with both fixed effects and clustered standard errors by year.

*OLS Models Predicting Congruent Value Endorsement with Additional Controls*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
1990	-	0.00445	0.00564	0.00732	0.00616	-
	-	(0.00845)	(0.00849)	(0.00969)	(0.00848)	-
1992	0.0144	0.0178	0.0192	0.0257	0.0186	-
	(0.00917)	(0.00710)	(0.00711)	(0.00852)	(0.00710)	-
1994	0.0180	0.0218	0.0236	0.0315	0.0250	-
	(0.00887)	(0.00674)	(0.00676)	(0.00828)	(0.00675)	-
1996	0.0291	0.0318	0.0329	-	0.0334	0.0162
	(0.00874)	(0.00666)	(0.00667)	-	(0.00666)	(0.00712)
1998	-0.0271	-0.0247	-0.0229	-0.0548	-0.0212	-
	(0.0105)	(0.00904)	(0.00900)	(0.0114)	(0.00900)	-
2000	-0.00208	0.00431	0.00598	0.0178	0.00797	-
	(0.0118)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0114)	(0.0102)	-
male	-0.00413	-0.00498	-0.00357	0.00102	-0.00369	-0.0123
	(0.00501)	(0.00438)	(0.00442)	(0.00527)	(0.00437)	(0.00716)
age	-0.0501	-0.0333	-0.0350	-0.0345	-0.0335	-0.0334
	(0.0172)	(0.0149)	(0.0149)	(0.0178)	(0.0149)	(0.0243)
income	-0.0436	-0.0358	-0.0365	-0.0462	-0.0394	-0.0470
	(0.0131)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0141)	(0.0116)	(0.0191)
black	0.0417	0.0612	0.0563	0.0231	0.0570	0.0644
	(0.00992)	(0.00848)	(0.00841)	(0.0105)	(0.00836)	(0.0147)
Hispanic	0.00132	0.00677	0.00692	-0.00680	0.00738	0.0240
	(0.0104)	(0.00963)	(0.00957)	(0.0118)	(0.00962)	(0.0175)
education	0.0605	0.0544	0.0545	0.0333	0.0542	0.0577
	(0.0120)	(0.0106)	(0.0113)	(0.0130)	(0.0106)	(0.0170)
ideology	-0.166	-0.170	-0.182	-0.141	-0.183	-0.254
	(0.0129)	(0.0116)	(0.0114)	(0.0138)	(0.0113)	(0.0173)
strength	0.0754	0.0734	0.0715	0.0779	0.0674	0.0661
	(0.0127)	(0.0112)	(0.0113)	(0.0132)	(0.0112)	(0.0184)

interest	0.0545 (0.0119)	0.0552 (0.0103)	0.0538 (0.0103)	0.0523 (0.0126)	0.0464 (0.0105)	0.0422 (0.0174)
discuss	0.0353 (0.00758)	0.0267 (0.00682)	0.0274 (0.00683)	0.0277 (0.00819)	0.0231 (0.00692)	0.0422 (0.0108)
media	-0.0157 (0.00933)	-0.0180 (0.00833)	-0.0181 (0.00830)	-0.0126 (0.00999)	-0.0189 (0.00830)	-0.00661 (0.0130)
know	0.0181 (0.0185)	0.0142 (0.0158)	0.0139 (0.0158)	0.0174 (0.0188)	0.0136 (0.0157)	0.0323 (0.0260)
Protestant	-	-0.0289 (0.00749)	-	-	-	-
Catholic	-	-0.0199 (0.00799)	-	-	-	-
Jewish	-	0.00889 (0.0152)	-	-	-	-
church	-0.00836 (0.00697)	-	-	-	-	-
occupation	-	-	-0.00550 (0.00924)	-	-	-
resentment	-	-	-	-0.131 (0.0169)	-	-
participation	-	-	-	-	0.0470 (0.0134)	-
attention	-	-	-	-	-	0.0268 (0.0190)
Constant	0.554 (0.0213)	0.569 (0.0184)	0.559 (0.0190)	0.624 (0.0244)	0.555 (0.0177)	0.600 (0.0294)
Observations	3,656	4,603	4,603	3,351	4,603	1,666
R-squared	0.114	0.124	0.120	0.127	0.122	0.173

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*OLS Models Predicting Congruent Value Endorsement with All Controls, without Robust Standard Errors, and with both Fixed Effects and Clustered Standard Errors by Year.*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
male	-0.00455 (0.0109)	-0.00284 (0.00439)	-0.00322 (0.00603)
age	0.0315 (0.0353)	-0.0326 (0.0145)	-0.0348 (0.0322)
income	-0.0645 (0.0300)	-0.0380 (0.0110)	-0.0363 (0.00876)
black	0.0466 (0.0217)	0.0541 (0.00843)	0.0564 (0.0248)
Hispanic	0.0186 (0.0319)	0.00667 (0.00970)	0.00698 (0.0135)
education	0.0348 (0.0254)	0.0560 (0.0106)	0.0568 (0.00775)
ideology	-0.244	-0.181	-0.183

	(0.0264)	(0.0111)	(0.0658)
strength	0.0684	0.0720	0.0713
	(0.0262)	(0.0111)	(0.00840)
interest	0.00920	0.0634	0.0540
	(0.0266)	(0.0104)	(0.00306)
discuss	0.0277	0.0265	0.0274
	(0.0160)	(0.00661)	(0.00925)
media	0.00567	-0.0238	-0.0181
	(0.0193)	(0.00800)	(0.00852)
know	0.0408	0.0164	0.0140
	(0.0356)	(0.0157)	(0.0104)
participation	0.0736	-	-
	(0.0312)	-	-
resentment	-0.143	-	-
	(0.0319)	-	-
occupation	-0.00333	-	-
	(0.0215)	-	-
protestant	-0.0327	-	-
	(0.0177)	-	-
catholic	-0.0117	-	-
	(0.0193)	-	-
Jewish	0.0161	-	-
	(0.0314)	-	-
church	-0.00564	-	-
	(0.0150)	-	-
attention	0.0324	-	-
	(0.0303)	-	-
1990	-	-	0.00552
	-	-	(0.00205)
1992	-	-	0.0192
	-	-	(0.000834)
1994	-	-	0.0237
	-	-	(0.00207)
1996	-	-	0.0331
	-	-	(0.00168)
1998	-	-	-0.0228
	-	-	(0.00159)
2000	-	-	0.00617
	-	-	(0.00335)
Constant	0.699	0.561	0.555
	(0.0495)	(0.0170)	(0.0243)
Observations	886	4,603	4,603
R-squared	0.227	0.108	0.120

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**Examining the Dependent Variable.** In the following analyses, I remove each question (one by one) from the dependent variable and rerun the main OLS model. In the first table, *model 1* removes the first equality question, *model 2* removes the second equality question, *model 3* removes the third equality question, *model 4* removes the fourth equality question, and *model 5* removes the fifth equality question. In the second table, *model 1* removes the sixth equality question, *model 2* removes the first morality question, *model 3* removes the second morality question, *model 4* removes the third morality question, and *model 5* removes the fourth morality question. None of the main results change.

*OLS Models Removing Particular Questions (First Table)*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
1990	0.00228 (0.00904)	0.00171 (0.00868)	0.000905 (0.00889)	4.63e-05 (0.00892)	0.00233 (0.00876)
1992	0.0365 (0.00786)	0.0378 (0.00736)	0.0322 (0.00747)	0.0366 (0.00748)	0.0376 (0.00732)
1994	0.0103 (0.00817)	0.0117 (0.00769)	0.0107 (0.00794)	0.00897 (0.00788)	0.0155 (0.00782)
1996	0.00199 (0.00780)	0.00199 (0.00741)	-0.000819 (0.00758)	-5.15e-05 (0.00760)	0.00280 (0.00748)
1998	-0.180 (0.00738)	-0.271 (0.00693)	-0.201 (0.00723)	-0.200 (0.00719)	-0.204 (0.00715)
2000	0.00786 (0.0125)	0.00572 (0.0118)	0.00933 (0.0119)	0.00403 (0.0121)	0.00800 (0.0119)
male	0.00693 (0.00472)	0.0102 (0.00444)	0.00774 (0.00457)	0.0103 (0.00457)	0.00919 (0.00447)
age	-0.155 (0.0161)	-0.141 (0.0150)	-0.152 (0.0155)	-0.132 (0.0156)	-0.138 (0.0153)
income	-0.0347 (0.0121)	-0.0373 (0.0113)	-0.0335 (0.0117)	-0.0421 (0.0116)	-0.0399 (0.0114)
black	0.0475 (0.00660)	0.0346 (0.00626)	0.0368 (0.00637)	0.0475 (0.00621)	0.0446 (0.00628)
Hispanic	0.0173 (0.00892)	0.0185 (0.00813)	0.0156 (0.00856)	0.0213 (0.00875)	0.0178 (0.00835)
education	0.100 (0.0121)	0.0753 (0.0114)	0.0978 (0.0117)	0.0926 (0.0117)	0.0815 (0.0115)
ideology	-0.255 (0.0141)	-0.224 (0.0133)	-0.248 (0.0137)	-0.243 (0.0137)	-0.242 (0.0135)
strength	0.0133 (0.0126)	0.0144 (0.0117)	0.0169 (0.0122)	0.0199 (0.0122)	0.0141 (0.0118)
interest	0.0314 (0.0112)	0.0321 (0.0106)	0.0313 (0.0109)	0.0288 (0.0108)	0.0283 (0.0107)
discuss	0.0124 (0.00760)	0.00810 (0.00715)	0.0132 (0.00739)	0.0101 (0.00742)	0.0112 (0.00727)
media	-0.00890 (0.00924)	-0.00433 (0.00864)	-0.00507 (0.00892)	-0.00676 (0.00898)	-0.00604 (0.00876)
know	0.0122	0.0114	0.0105	0.00911	0.00615



	(0.0166)	(0.0158)	(0.0160)	(0.0161)	(0.0158)
Constant	0.724	0.742	0.737	0.733	0.752
	(0.0199)	(0.0185)	(0.0194)	(0.0191)	(0.0187)
Observations	2,395	2,395	2,395	2,395	2,395
R-squared	0.425	0.535	0.455	0.445	0.458

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*OLS Models Removing Particular Questions (Second Table)*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
1990	0.000709	0.00179	0.00112	0.00133	0.00108
	(0.00873)	(0.00899)	(0.00906)	(0.00930)	(0.00878)
1992	0.0316	0.0349	0.0299	0.0358	0.0410
	(0.00747)	(0.00761)	(0.00754)	(0.00787)	(0.00754)
1994	0.00883	0.0106	0.0107	0.0124	0.0102
	(0.00783)	(0.00794)	(0.00795)	(0.00827)	(0.00793)
1996	-0.000679	-0.00146	0.00239	0.00236	0.000193
	(0.00758)	(0.00772)	(0.00748)	(0.00787)	(0.00779)
1998	-0.283	-0.226	-0.218	-0.224	-0.225
	(0.00711)	(0.00730)	(0.00726)	(0.00755)	(0.00751)
2000	0.00781	0.00409	0.00732	0.0149	0.00222
	(0.0121)	(0.0120)	(0.0117)	(0.0127)	(0.0125)
male	0.00935	0.00591	0.00178	0.0126	0.0155
	(0.00454)	(0.00458)	(0.00460)	(0.00477)	(0.00464)
age	-0.152	-0.120	-0.153	-0.143	-0.165
	(0.0156)	(0.0158)	(0.0156)	(0.0163)	(0.0157)
income	-0.0340	-0.0418	-0.0286	-0.0419	-0.0353
	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)
black	0.0414	0.0491	0.0350	0.0452	0.0391
	(0.00631)	(0.00648)	(0.00634)	(0.00679)	(0.00653)
Hispanic	0.0137	0.0239	0.00813	0.0206	0.0168
	(0.00842)	(0.00870)	(0.00838)	(0.00926)	(0.00860)
education	0.102	0.0821	0.109	0.0776	0.0974
	(0.0116)	(0.0117)	(0.0118)	(0.0123)	(0.0119)
ideology	-0.249	-0.236	-0.253	-0.239	-0.246
	(0.0135)	(0.0139)	(0.0136)	(0.0144)	(0.0138)
strength	0.0118	0.0125	0.00835	0.0190	0.0203
	(0.0121)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0127)	(0.0124)
interest	0.0288	0.0277	0.0370	0.0301	0.0257
	(0.0109)	(0.0110)	(0.0109)	(0.0114)	(0.0110)
discuss	0.0119	0.0119	0.0115	0.00937	0.0119
	(0.00734)	(0.00741)	(0.00736)	(0.00778)	(0.00752)
media	-0.00748	-0.00477	-0.0129	-0.000657	-0.00737
	(0.00894)	(0.00903)	(0.00901)	(0.00935)	(0.00899)
know	0.0135	0.0161	0.0142	-0.000265	0.0118
	(0.0161)	(0.0158)	(0.0162)	(0.0172)	(0.0165)
Constant	0.734	0.744	0.728	0.769	0.707

	(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.0193)	(0.0200)	(0.0198)
Observations	2,395	2,395	2,395	2,395	2,395
R-squared	0.553	0.464	0.479	0.448	0.481

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**Changing Model Estimation.** The models below estimate a different OLS model: predicting the endorsement of values by an interaction between discussion and partisanship (i.e.,  $value\ endorsement = discuss * partydummy$ ). The *value endorsement* variable is a continuous variable from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate greater endorsement of Democratic values (i.e., *equality* and *moral tolerance*) and lesser endorsement of Republican values (i.e., *inequality*—or the opposite of equality—and *traditional morality*). The first independent variable of interest here is *discuss*, as in previous analyses. This variable is then interacted with *partisanship*, which is recoded as a dummy variable where *Democrat* (1) includes leaning, weak, and strong Democrats and Republican (0) includes leaning, weak, and strong Republicans. The interactive variable of *discuss* and *partisanship* is the independent variable of interest here.

Unless noted otherwise, models include robust standard errors and the same controls from the previous models (*year, gender, age, income, black, Hispanic, education, ideology, partisan strength, political interest, media consumption, and political knowledge*). The table and figure show the marginal effect of *discuss* by *partydummy*. Model 1 predicts the endorsement of *democratic values* (*equality* and *moral tolerance*). For a better representation, see the figure below which shows the differential effects of discussion based on whether one is a Democrat or Republican. If one is a Democrat (*partisanship*=1), political discussions have a positive effect on the endorsement of democratic values. If, on the other hand, one is a Republican (*partisanship*=0), political discussions have a *negative* effect on the endorsement of political values. This interaction is highly significant ( $p < .000$ ).


Model 2 ( $n=4,603$ ) excludes fixed effects, while *model 3* ( $n=4,603$ ) clusters the standard errors by years (and also, then, removes the robust standard errors). Lastly, *model 4* ( $n=11,458$ ) excludes the aforementioned controls, only including  $discuss * partydummy$  and robust standard errors in the model. Removing fixed effects mitigates the effect of discussions for Democrats, but not for Republicans. All independent variables were recoded 0 to 1.

*Marginal Effect of Discussion on Value Endorsement by Partisanship*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Democrat	0.0190 (0.0070)	0.0076 (0.0083)	0.0076 (0.0122)	0.0478 (0.0057)
Republican	-0.0457 (0.0072)	-0.0392 (0.0079)	-0.0392 (0.0124)	-0.0608 (0.0054)

Standard errors in parentheses

*Marginal Effect of Discuss on Democratic Values Endorsement  
(0=Republican, 1=Democrat)*



## Appendix C: Additional Data from General Discussion

*Competing Environments.* The following analysis isolates the sample to just Democrats who attend church at least a few times a year (i.e., not never). This is to try to address the question of competing environments. A perfect example of a person dealing with competing environments in relation to political values is Democrats who attend church—whereas their Democratic environment likely endorses moral tolerance, for example, their church environment likely endorses the opposite, moral traditionalism. In cases such as these, it is likely that the environments cancel each other out, just as competing frames cancel out framing effects (see Chong and Druckman 2007). Indeed, in this case we see that the effect of *discuss* is no longer significant at conventional levels ( $p=0.059$ ), although it is important to note that the difference between a significant *discuss* coefficient and a non-significant *discuss* coefficient is not, in itself, significant. I must also note that this change in significance could be a result of the decreased sample size ( $n=2,034$ , whereas in full sample analysis  $n=4,603$ ). Ultimately, more research is needed to address the question of competing environments.

### *OLS with Democratic Church Goers*

	Model 1
1990	-0.00980 (0.00853)
1992	0.0215 (0.00770)
1994	0.00202 (0.00852)
1996	-0.00337 (0.00770)
1998	-0.228 (0.00736)
2000	-0.0111 (0.0125)
male	0.00968 (0.00482)
age	-0.150 (0.0164)
income	-0.0265 (0.0126)
black	0.0565 (0.00643)
Hispanic	0.0256 (0.00894)
education	0.0768 (0.0124)
ideology	-0.217 (0.0145)
strength	0.0337 (0.00967)

interest	0.0200 (0.0113)
discuss	0.0151 (0.00800)
media	0.00235 (0.00944)
know	-0.00429 (0.0169)
Constant	0.715 (0.0185)
Observations	2,034
R-squared	0.461

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**Values as Norms.** To examine this question, I ask respondents four questions at the end of the experiment: how they would feel if a co-partisan did not value equality, how they would feel if an opposing partisan did not value equality, how they would feel if a co-partisan did not value self-reliance, and how they would feel if an opposing partisan did not value self-reliance. I asked these under the assumption that if these values were indeed norms, partisans should punish co-partisans for not valuing their party's values, but not punish opposing partisans for not valuing these values. Simple disappointment in others not valuing one's party's values would lead to participants equally punishing both co-partisans and opposing partisans.

First, I conduct two simple chi-squared tests to see how partisans feel about others not valuing equality and then not valuing self-reliance, seeing if they feel differently depending on if the other person is a Republican or a Democrat. Both of these tests produce highly significant differences ( $p < .000$ ). To see what is going on more specifically, I create a binary dependent variable that is 1 if the participant says they are disappointed in the person and 0 if they say they are proud, say it doesn't matter, or say other. I then conduct various t-tests, with two interests: how Democrats view other Democrats who don't endorse equality as compared to how they view Republicans who don't endorse equality ( $p = .007$ ), and how Republicans view other Republicans who don't endorse self-reliance as compared to how they view Democrats who don't endorse self-reliance ( $p = .595$ ). There seems to be little norm among Republicans with self-reliance, but quite a strong norm among Democrats with equality. This could be due to a difference between either Republicans and Democrats or equality and self-reliance (or both).

#### *Views Towards Partisans' Values*

<i>Subjects</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Objects</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>P-value</i>
<i>Republicans</i>	Equality	Republicans	112	.625	.05	1.00
		Democrats	112	.625	.05	
	Self-Reliance	Republicans	117	.786	.04	.595
		Democrats	117	.769	.04	
<i>Democrats</i>	Equality	Republicans	179	.89	.02	.007
		Democrats	179	.95	.02	
	Self-Reliance	Republicans	163	.48	.04	.435
		Democrats	163	.51	.04	