

The Social Dimension of Political Values

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Abstract. Worries about the instability of political attitudes and lack of ideological constraint among the public are often pacified by the assumption that individuals have stable political values. These political values are assumed to help individuals filter political information and thus both minimize outside influence and guide people through complex political environments. This perspective, though, assumes that political values are stable and consistent across contexts. This piece questions that assumption and argues that political values are socially reinforced—that is, that political values are not internal predispositions, but the result of social influence. I consider this idea with two empirical tests: an experimental test that recreates the transmission of political values and an observational analysis of the effect of politically homogeneous social contexts on political value endorsements. Results suggest that political values are socially reinforced. The broader implication of my findings is that the concepts scholars term “political values” may be reflections of individuals’ social contexts rather than values governing political behavior.

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Introduction

There is a normative democratic concern about the instability of political attitudes and lack of ideological constraint among the public (e.g., Campbell et al. 1954; Converse 1964). Indeed, as Valentino and Nardis (2013) claim, “If people do not have stable preferences over competing policies, as Downs’s (1957) economic theory of democracy demands, constructing a government that effectively translates majority preferences into policies is impossible.” The worry is—if the public has unstable attitudes that are easily manipulated by social influence, the media, and political elites (Zaller 1992), how can individuals make reasonable political choices or—at the very least—elect representatives that best serve their interests?

Zaller’s (1992) answer to this question is that people are not simply passive observers of political information. Instead, individuals filter information from elites through “stable, individual-level traits”: political values (Zaller 1992). Scholars have long considered political values an important component of preferences, arguing that political values influence ideology, issue attitudes, partisanship, and presidential evaluation (see Feldman 2013), and may even explain political choices *better than* ideology (Caprara and Vecchione 2013). As Nelson and Garst (2005), explain, “In lieu of political ideology, which...the general public lacks, values function as general standards for evaluating candidates, policies, and other objects in the political universe.”

Underlying this idea, however, is an important assumption that political values “transcend specific situations,” as Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) argue basic human values do.¹ It is assumed, for example, that when a person approaches a new political issue or decision, she will turn to her political values, among other predispositions, to inform that decision. In this view, political decisions can be coherent and fairly independent, even if the person lacks all the information or a clear ideology. If, however, political values fail to “transcend specific situations,” those decisions lack the independent and coherent quality that we seek. Essentially, if we are to assume that political values guide us, we must also assume that they are stable and not easily moved.

Yet, recent research puts this assumption in doubt, suggesting that political values are less stable, and perhaps more malleable, than previous scholarship had assumed (e.g., Goren 2005; Goren et al. 2009; McCann 1997; Nelson et al. 1997). These more recent findings stand in contrast to research suggesting that political values are a consistent filter on outside political information. Addressing this conflicting research, I approach political values from a new perspective. I argue that political values are *not* fundamental guides in the political world. Instead, I theorize that people adopt the political values of those around them because it is socially desirable to do so. Reported political values, I suggest, are a function of social influence—implying, then, that political values may be no more stable or robust than basic political attitudes.²

¹ While there is large body of literature on values (for example, the values that form moral foundations—see Graham et al., 2009) here my focus is on *political values* (Caprara and Vecchione 2013; Ciuk 2017; Feldman 1988, 2003, 2013; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Goren 2005; Goren et al. 2009; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Jacoby 2006, 2014; Knutsen 1995; Kuklinski 2001; McCann 1997; Nelson and Garst 2005; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Schwartz et al. 2010; Zaller 1992).

² Research finds that political *attitudes* can be influenced by social and survey contexts (e.g., Bartels 2003; Chong and Druckman 2007; Nelson et al. 1997; Klar 2014; Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), but the assumption is that political *values* are more stable (see Caprara and Vecchione 2013).

My empirical analyses—one that relies on an experiment and one that translates these results into a broader perspective using American National Election Studies (ANES) data—suggest that the endorsement of political values is shaped by one’s social environment. These results, which are consistent across both methods as well as various robustness checks, imply a new, social dimension to the political values we previously knew as robust and deep-seated.

What Are Political Values?

Political scientists define political values as “abstract, general conceptions about the desirable or undesirable end-states of human life,” which provide people with a “general evaluative standard for confronting the world” (Jacoby 2006). Values are different from political attitudes—while both are evaluative, values are “relatively few and more central” than attitudes (Feldman 2003).

Scholars generally endorse this conceptual definition of political values, where political values are core to the self and guide political behavior. Values have been found to predict positions and attitudes on social welfare (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), government spending (Jacoby 2006), candidate evaluations (Feldman 1988), beliefs about racial equality (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and judgments on tolerance (Peffley et al. 2001), among others—leading to partisanship-aligned value polarization (Jacoby 2014). In fact, Schwartz et al. (2010) argue that values account for 54% of the variance in vote choice, concluding that values are foundational in explaining variation in political attitudes and behavior. This view of political values as political guides is further enforced by research suggesting that political values help filter political information (Kam 2005; Zaller 1992) and guide people through complex political environments (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).

In contrast to this set of findings, though, there is other evidence that individuals’ endorsements of political values may be less consistent than originally assumed. Nelson et al. (1997), for example, show that issue framing can change the relevance of political values to individuals, and McCann (1997) finds that the endorsement of political values is constrained by candidate evaluation. Taking these ideas a step further, Goren (2005) and Goren et al. (2009) investigate the relationship between partisanship and values, finding that partisanship is more stable than political values and that partisan cues can affect the expression of values.

Yet even while acknowledging that values are heavily dependent on partisanship, Goren et al. (2009) resist the implications that values are largely a function of party preferences, noting that, “to be clear, we are not claiming that core political values are akin to other short-term perceptions. We believe, like many others, that political values are central elements in mass belief systems. Nor do we expect that partisan influence will produce wholesale value change. Instead, partisan forces should affect values at the margins, essentially leading identifiers to become a little bit more or less enamored of a given value” (Goren et al. 2009).

Indeed, while Goren (2005) and Goren et al. (2009) suggest that causally values may be driven by partisanship, more recent work on political values returns to the idea that values guide certain political issue positions, over and above partisanship (Evans and Neundorf 2018).

The aforementioned research suggests two points. First, much of the research in political science assumes that values are more robust than attitudes: that while attitudes can be shifted by changing context or social environment, values mean more to people and thus are more resistant to change. Second, however, there are hints that values may be more malleable than some of this foundational research on values assumes, though this work stops short of dismissing the idea of stable underlying values. Building on these findings, in this manuscript I argue that there is a *social* dimension to political values—specifically, that people adopt the political values of those around

them because it is socially desirable to do so. My argument stands in contrast to the idea that individuals' political values are immutable political guides and builds on the idea that they are malleable. I go further, though, and argue that social influence underlies this malleability.

Social Influence & Value Endorsements

Social Influence. Research suggests that people are highly motivated by social goals (Cosmides and Tooby 1992). Indeed, Goffman's (1967) theory of face management claims that individuals present a "face"—or some positive social value—to others in attempt to exude the most positive impression of themselves. People then work at this type of "self-presentation" almost constantly (Holtgraves 1992) and will consciously misreport themselves to avoid embarrassment or to make themselves appear more impressive (Kuran 1997; Zaller and Feldman 1992). That is, the desire to maintain a positive impression plays a substantial role in individuals' lives.

This tendency to misrepresent oneself based on self-presentation desires can be tracked by the self-monitoring trait, where those high in self-monitoring care more about impressing others than those low in self-monitoring do. A key component of this is the desire to be similar to certain types of people or associated with positively-perceived groups in hopes of achieving a positive self-presentation. Thus, telling individuals that a socially desirable group has a certain attitude or behaves in a certain way will lead high self-monitors to change their attitudes and behavior to conform to that group (see Mutz 1998). This research implies the *power* of social settings—they can lead people to suppress unpopular or contentious opinions (Carlson and Settle 2016; Klar 2014), as well as change how people describe their partisan identities (Klar and Krupnikov 2016).

Theory. Given the importance of social influence in various aspects of political behavior, I theorize that the social environment also influences individuals' reported political values. This theory stands in contrast to the idea that political values are far more robust than political attitudes. Rather, my theoretic approach suggests value plasticity, offering an explanation for why people's values are malleable yet congruent with other political beliefs. My theoretic approach suggests that much like political attitudes, political values are not only mutable but also socially-constrained.

In particular, I argue that people report certain value positions because it helps them achieve a positive self-presentation. Note, though, that the perception of what is socially desirable can differ depending on one's social context, environment, or network. That is, a Democrat's interpretation of a socially desirable value likely differs from a Republican's interpretation of a socially desirable value (see Klar and Krupnikov 2016 for discussion of social desirability being context-dependent). Thus, I argue that Democrats adopt Democratic political values because they infer that it is socially desirable to value equality and moral tolerance, for example. Or, Republicans *reject* these values because they infer it is socially desirable to do so. Generally, I argue that the social reinforcement of values is driven by self-presentation desires, based on the extent to which one finds the group expressing the value attractive (Mutz 1992). While Mutz (1992) views social influence as the desire to be similar to a group with which one identifies, its effect may be *especially* powerful when this social influence is also contextual (see Huckfeldt 1983; Huckfeldt et al. 2013). That is, being surrounded by co-partisans may exacerbate the endorsement of party-congruent values.³

³ While there are various types of outside influence, including elite (Zaller 1992) and impersonal (Cialdini et al. 1990), this piece's focus is on *social* influence (Huckfeldt et al. 2013). Mutz (1992) defines social influence as that which is motivated by the desire to be similar to a certain group.

Though this paper is the first to explicitly offer direct empirical evidence of the social reinforcement of political values, existing research hints that social factors may be important in value endorsements. Jacoby (2006), for example, posits the possibility—but does not offer a theoretic argument or empirical test of the idea—that values are socially influenced by noting that, “people experience vastly different socialization experiences and patterns of social interaction; it would be incredible if this did *not* have some noticeable effect on...values.” The theory in this piece specifically addresses this notion by proposing, developing, and empirically considering the possibility that political values are socially reinforced.

Importantly, the potential that political values are a function of social forces also corresponds to the partisanship-aligned value polarization that we see—where Republicans emphasize morality, patriotism, and social order, and Democrats emphasize equality, economic security, and (to a lesser extent) freedom (Jacoby 2014). That is, although I argue that social desirability drives value endorsements, this does not mean that there should be one set of ideal political values. Since the two political parties endorse diametrically opposed sets of values, there should be similarly two sets of socially desirable values—one for Democrats and another for Republicans.

Value Change or Expression Change? Before I turn to my empirical analyses, it is important to note that studies on social influence often examine change in *expression* rather than “true” change in opinions or attitudes (see especially Carlson and Settle (2016) who make this explicit). Indeed, while the measures used often demonstrate clear changes in expression, whether these shifts are accompanied by changes in underlying positions is more difficult to capture. Yet, showing changes in expressed values due to social cues is important regardless of whether this reflects a change in expression or a change in actual values. Indeed, as I argue below, a change in expression can be as just as crucial—or perhaps even more so—than a true change in position.

Much like previous research, the findings I present cannot empirically determine whether shifts in expression are reflective of “true” value changes or changes in the expression of one’s values. I argue, though, that either way the findings are important. If people’s values are changing in response to social influence, we have evidence that the values political scientists believe are fundamental to how people think and behave politically can be influenced by those around them. This would suggest that values are unlikely to be guiding people through the complex political world as some research suggests (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Zaller 1992), implying that worries about citizens’ ability to engage in politics may not be alleviated by political values. That is, the findings would suggest that social influence matters more than values themselves.

The possibility that people’s value *expressions* change as a result of social cues leads to similarly daunting conclusions, however. For the sake of argument, let us assume a scenario where people’s values do not change *at all* and they simply answer value questions differently based on social influence at a given time. This may seem to be an innocuous measurement issue, but it has broad implications for research on values. Scholars capture values through survey questions. Therefore, if participants’ value expressions are moved by social cues, and then these values subsequently correlate with key political outcomes (e.g., Jacoby 2006, 2014), this would mean that it is actually responsiveness to social influence that is the better predictor of the numerous important political outcomes. In short, whether the results in this piece indicate value change or change of value expression, the findings speak to the primacy of social influence and undercut the primacy of values. Either a construct we use is socially influenced or its expression simply indicates a belief in following social cues. *Both* possibilities suggest that social influence matters more than the values themselves. Thus, while I am cognizant of the difference between expression and value change, for ease of discussion I simply refer to shifts in values—acknowledging that

these shifts may be due to either expression *or* value change.

Expectations and Empirical Approach

My empirical approach uses experimental and observational evidence to consider the expectation that people use social cues to determine the types of value responses that will make the most positive impression on others. I first rely on a survey experiment and subsequently turn to a set of analyses of ANES data. While each approach comes with its own limitations, jointly they allow me to consider my theoretic expectations from two different perspectives.

I rely on the survey experiment to analyze the causal effect of social cues on value endorsements. In this experimental approach I also directly consider the extent to which individuals' desire to present the most positive version of themselves exacerbates the influence of social cues on value reports. To do so, I make use of *self-monitoring*, a characteristic that captures susceptibility to social pressure (Berinsky 2004; Berinsky and Lavine 2012; Gangestad and Snyder 2000; Lavine and Snyder 1996; Terkildsen 1993; Weber et al. 2014). If, as I expect, people rely on cues because they want to make the most positive impressions, the effect of the social cue will change at different levels of self-monitoring. I thus theorize that those high in self-monitoring (i.e., those most susceptible to social pressure) will alter their values to look good more than those low in self-monitoring (i.e., those least susceptible to social pressure) will—or, that the effect of the social cue on value endorsement will increase with higher levels of self-monitoring. This would imply that the social reinforcement of values is driven by self-presentation desires.

Further, to enhance the external validity of these findings and consider these patterns in a broader perspective, I then use the 2000 ANES social networks data. This dataset allows me to test the effect of having a politically homogeneous social network on endorsing party-congruent values. In doing so, I can analyze the social reinforcement of values in the real world. Note that this empirical approach aims to examine the effect of social influence on value endorsement by both experimentally manipulating the independent variable as well as measuring it using observational data. This approach enhances the overall validity of the findings by responding to an empirical question with various methods (see Shadish et al. 2002).

Experiment

My experiment is designed to analyze whether social cues will influence reported political values. I predict that this will be moderated by the self-monitoring trait, where those high in self-monitoring will be more influenced by the social cue those low in self-monitoring will. Given that some political values are engrained in our political culture, using already-established political values would threaten internal validity due to partisan pre-treatment (Druckman and Leeper 2012). That is, since people may know prior to entering the study that Democrats and Republicans endorse different sets of values, we can infer that they have already been “treated” with partisan cues in the real world. Thus, encountering a treatment in the context of the experiment would either be redundant (if congruent) or jarring enough to affect experimental validity (if incongruent). Both effects would undermine the experiment. Further, since the aim of this experiment is to capitalize on treatment randomization and maintain internal validity, this threat of pretreatment is especially worrisome. Thus, the only way to examine the social reinforcement of values is by using a political value that has similar criteria to our current political values but is relatively unaligned with political parties. So, for the purposes of the experiment, I identified a non-partisan political value.

Values. In order to directly test the effects of social cues, I considered political constructs that meet the qualities we associate with political values: a potential for a split in public support for the two ends of the value and a strong belief among participants that the value is, indeed, a political value—i.e., that it refers to a “preferable mode of conduct or desirable end-state” (Feldman 2013) or can “guide political decisions” (as it is worded to participants). Moreover, to avoid partisan pre-treatment effects, this new value must lack association with a political party. Following these standards, I identified a set of political concepts that could appear to experimental participants to be political values. Then, I conducted two pre-tests to consider individual perceptions of these political concepts. Both pre-tests used data from two samples recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk; *pre-test 1* $N=500$; *pre-test 2* $N=166$).

In pre-test 1, participants were asked to consider 10 different political constructs (all listed in *Appendix A*). Specifically, they were asked how much they support the construct, if they associate it with a political party (and if so which party), if they believe the idea is a “value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make,” and if they believe the idea is a “value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives.” Full question wording can be found in *Appendix A.2*. In pre-test 2, a different group of participants was asked to consider the same 10 constructs, but this time each construct was paired with its logical opposite and participants were asked if they thought these values were in opposition to each other (i.e., “if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other”) or if they were compatible (i.e., “that you can equally support and rely on both values”). The full question-wording and the full list of pairs participants considered can be found in *Appendix A.4*.

These pre-tests showed that the political constructs that appeared to participants to be most like political values were the opposing constructs of compromise versus standing your ground (from this point on, I call this value *compromise*, but it includes both ends—compromise versus standing your ground). The compromise value showed variance in opinion, had little association with a political party, and, most importantly, the majority of participants believed this was a fundamental political value.⁴ Full results from these pre-tests can be found in *Appendix A.3* and *Appendix A.5*.

Methods. In order to consider the effect of social cues on reported values, I rely on participants recruited via Mturk ($N=400$).⁵ Of these participants, half were randomly assigned to take this study

⁴ Although I use a value that has minimal *partisan* pre-treatment, there exists some *general* pre-treatment in that participants likely already had some views towards these values (see value distributions in preliminary studies). This may be beneficial, as it suggests the treatment led participants to *change* their perception of this value (rather than to initially develop it) in response to a social cue that branded compromise as endorsed by a positively-viewed political group. This speaks to the theory as values being socially reinforced rather than socially created.

⁵ The sample was: 48% female, 79% white, 51% college graduate or above; mean age of 38; 34% leaning, weak, or strong Republican, 13% pure Independent, and 53% leaning, weak, or strong Democrat; slightly skewed liberal (mean of 3.66 on scale from 1 to 7); above average in terms of interest in news (mean of 1.65 on scale from 1 to 3), taking part in political discussions (mean of 2.68 on scale from 0 to 7), and attention to news media (mean of 4.15 on scale from 0 to 7). Given this sample is above average in terms of education, interest, discussions, and attention to media, pretreatment is especially threatening (see Druckman and Leeper 2012), reinforcing the decision

and the other half were randomized to take a different study. This randomization into two different studies left the study reported here with $N=192$.

The study proceeded as follows. First, participants answered a set of questions about demographics, typical media usage, political interest, and the like. Among these questions were three self-monitoring questions ($\alpha=.66$)—responses to these were then combined to create a 13-point self-monitoring scale (see Berinsky and Lavine 2012). Similar to its distribution in the population, self-monitoring was skewed towards low self-monitoring, with a mean of 7.11 on a scale from 3 to 15 (recoded from low to high self-monitoring). Again, self-monitoring was measured to better examine social influence—where I predict that social cues should influence the endorsement of values for high self-monitors (those whose goal it is to impress others) more than for low self-monitors (those who try to present their authentic selves). Finding this moderating effect would suggest that the social reinforcement of values is driven by self-presentation desires.

Following their responses to these preliminary questions, participants were told, “People vary greatly on which value they believe in: *compromise* (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) or *standing your ground* (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate).” Participants were then randomly assigned to either receive a social cue about these values (the treatment condition) or receive no such cue (the control condition). Since a key component of social influence is the desire to be like certain types of people—and avoid associations with other types of people—the social cue aimed to suggest to participants that a positively-viewed group supports compromise over standing your ground.

To ensure that the social cue functioned in this theorized way, I conducted a pre-test with a separate sample of Mturk participants ($N=500$), in which respondents were asked to rate how much they want to have in common with 9 groups of people. Out of the 9 groups asked about, the group of “people who listen to news sources that support both political parties” was seen as the most positive—a 7.17 on a scale from 1 to 10 (negative to positive)—an outcome that follows from previous literature (Klar et al. 2018).⁶ Thus, this group was selected to give the social cue in the treatment condition—their endorsement of compromise should increase participants’ (especially high self-monitors’) compromise endorsement.

This main manipulation (the social cue) was embedded in the value question, where participants in the treatment group then read, “Interestingly, though, researchers have shown that those who listen to news sources that support both political parties tend to value *compromise* over *standing your ground*.” As a reminder, those in the control group read the same previous statement as those in the treatment group—that, “People vary greatly on which value they believe in *compromise* (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) or *standing your ground* (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate)”—but did *not* receive the follow-up social cue statement that the treatment group received.

Notably, this method of testing social influence is a conservative one. There are a number of ways to test social influence (see Huckfeldt et al. 2013), including possibly stronger treatments such as conducting a discussion with a confederate (e.g., Klar 2014) or using partisan cues (e.g., Cohen 2003). Notably, however, research on social cues is ambivalent about the possibility that

to use non-established political values. Lastly, a check was conducted on the sample to examine the influence of bots on the collected data, which found non-threatening results (see *Appendix A.6*).

⁶ Full question wording and results can be found in *Appendix A.2* and *Appendix A.3*.

using a confederate is a better operationalization of social influence (Meyer 1994). Although a study with a confederate may have a stronger effect, in this test I prioritize *control* over strength of treatment. If this *is* indeed a weaker treatment, then I have presented a more conservative test.

At the end of the experiment, participants in both conditions were then asked which end of the compromise value they support more—this was a zero-sum choice in that participants could not indicate support for both ends of the scale, and instead had to make a choice between compromise and standing your ground or say, “don’t know.”⁷ To be clear, the experiment varies whether or not participants received a social cue endorsing compromise or received no such cue. I predict that this socially desirable group’s endorsement of compromise will *increase* the number of participants who endorse compromise, and that this will be moderated by the self-monitoring trait. These findings will indicate that, driven by self-presentation desires, values are socially reinforced.

Results. The prediction for this experiment is that the social cue will influence the endorsement of political values and that this effect will be moderated by the self-monitoring trait. Specifically, following theoretic expectations, participants should follow the social cue and increasingly endorse compromise: the endorsement of compromise should be higher in the treatment than in the control condition. Once participants are split into low and high self-monitors, we should see that the social cue is effective for high self-monitors—those who want to be associated with positively-perceived groups—but not for low self-monitors, who care less about impressing others.

First, I examine the main effect of the social cue on value endorsement. This is shown in the first row of *Table 1*. Here we see that the social cue increases the endorsement of compromise at a marginally significant ($p=.091$) level. That is, when given the social cue that a positively-perceived group endorses compromise, more participants report valuing compromise over standing your ground (as compared to those given no social cue). Among all the participants, the treatment increases the mean endorsement of compromise by 12 percentage points.

Next, I examine the hypothesized moderating effect of self-monitoring. The self-monitoring scale can be considered in two ways: the scale can be split into two groups (Berinsky and Lavine 2012) or the scale can be used in its full form. I rely on both of these approaches—the former (the median split and two statistical tests) is represented in *Table 1* (rows 2 and 3) and *Figure 1*, and the latter (the continuous variable with marginal effects) can be found in *Appendix A.7*. These results support my theoretic expectations: when given the social cue, more high self-monitors report endorsing compromise as compared to standing your ground than when that cue is not present. In fact, for this group, the treatment increases the mean endorsement of compromise by 29 percentage points ($p=.0048$). Low self-monitors, on the other hand, endorse compromise 1 percentage point *less*, although this is far from significant ($p=.8530$).

Further, the effect of the social cue for high self-monitors is statistically different from the effect of the social cue for low self-monitors ($p=.026$; see *Appendix A.9*). To examine the robustness of these results—since self-monitoring is measured rather than manipulated—I see if adding controls alters the findings, which it does not (see Kam and Trussler 2017 for use of controls in experiments).⁸ Finally, to ensure that partisanship is not confounding the results, I not only add

⁷ The question wording for the dependent variable was: “What about you—which do you believe in more?” with the options of compromise, standing your ground, or don’t know.


⁸ The controls added as a robustness check to the findings were measured pre-treatment and included partisanship, ideology, gender, age, race, education, attention to news, how often one

partisanship as a control to the above model, but also examine if Republicans and Democrats reacted differently to the treatment. Although this latter check limits the sample size, we observe the same trend for both Democrats and Republicans (see *Appendix A.10*).

Table 1. Compromise Endorsement by Treatment, Self-Monitoring

	<i>Condition</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>T-Statistic</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
<i>All Participants</i>	No Cue	89	.55	.05	1.70	.0911
	Cue	103	.67	.05		
<i>High Self-Monitors</i>	No Cue	41	.49	.08	2.90	.0048
	Cue	45	.78	.06		
<i>Low Self-Monitors</i>	No Cue	48	.60	.07	0.19	.8530
	Cue	58	.59	.07		

Figure 1. Compromise Endorsement by Treatment, Self-Monitoring



Median split of high and low self-monitors; confidence intervals at 95%; full scale (0-1) shown

Discussion. These results speak to an integral part of the theory—that people alter their political values because it is socially desirable to do—or, because it looks good to others. The effect of the social cue on high self-monitors’ compromise endorsement supports this part of the theory. Again, when high self-monitors were told that a positively-viewed group endorses compromise, they

discusses of politics, and how often one consumes news. Wording of variables in *Appendix A.7*. These controls aim to also address worries about partisan stereotyping (Rothschild et al. 2018).

endorsed compromise as well. Low self-monitors did not do so, as they prioritize showing their authentic selves above impressing others. Overall, these findings give us both: 1) causal evidence that social cues can influence people's endorsements of political values, and 2) insight into the mechanism driving the social reinforcement of values—self-presentation desires. As explained previously, that we can observe results even with a potentially weaker treatment is a testament to the important role of social cues in determining values.

The experimental evidence, though, is potentially narrow in that while it addresses internal validity questions, it cannot necessarily speak to external validity concerns (Shadish et al. 2002). To supplement the experiment, then, I turn to observational, nationally-representative data, and rely on already-established political values (i.e., equality and morality). This next analysis can speak to external validity questions about the subject population. Further, and perhaps more importantly, this set of analyses can confront the construct validity question about the particular political values used in the experiment. The experiment—to avoid pretreatment—used a non-salient political value and in doing so increased internal validity but naturally sacrificed some construct validity.⁹ This is also where the observational analysis complements the experiment.

Observational Data

Based on my theoretic premises, we should observe that people who have consistent social reinforcement are more likely to report value positions that are congruent with their social groups. I consider this possibility using ANES data that tracks people's social contexts. While this approach is only a proxy for the types of social cues people may receive, it offers a useful extension of the experimental study.

Given the importance of social cues transmitted in networks (Huckfeldt et al. 2004), this set of analyses specifically examines the effect of politically homogeneous social networks (as compared to politically heterogeneous social networks) on individuals' political value endorsements—hypothesizing that having homogeneous networks increases the likelihood that one endorses party-congruent political values. This follows from my main argument. If political values are socially reinforced, then people should be likely to take on the value positions they are cued to take from their political discussants. That is, people who have more consistent social cues (i.e., people with politically-homogeneous social networks) should have more certainty and clarity about the *types* of political values they should report. Again, while this is a proxy for the mechanisms proposed in my theory, this analysis acts as an additional check on—as well as adds a contextual component to (Huckfeldt 1983)—the experimental results.

In conducting this analysis, I follow previous work on political values and use the political values that have been the focus of much recent work on values: equality and morality. These are the values that recent work on political values identifies as pivotal for individuals' politics (Jacoby 2006; Jacoby 2014; Goren 2005; Goren et al. 2009).¹⁰ In this way, again, this analysis enhances my approach's construct validity by incorporating values that political scientists often use in research.

⁹ In general, research on political values that does not include *all* identified political values leads to the natural question of how political values differ from each other. It is likely, for example, that the internalization of political values among the public likely differs by how clear social cues are, just as attitudes among the public differ depending on elite signaling (see Levendusky 2010).

¹⁰ As in previous literature, *morality* is comprised of both moral tolerance and moral traditionalism.

Methods. Data are drawn from the 2000 ANES, when the main independent variable—social networks—was measured. In this particular year, ANES respondents were asked to identify people with whom they discuss “government, elections and politics.” Respondents then answered follow-up questions about these people (i.e., their social network), including indicating who they believed each person voted for in the 2000 presidential election. This variable can be used to measure political homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of social networks.¹¹

Exercising this dataset, I test whether having a homogeneous social network leads people to be more likely to have party-congruent values. Since I use homogeneous social networks as a proxy for social influence, I predict that there will be a positive, significant effect of homogeneous social networks (*homogeneous network*) on the likelihood one’s political values are congruent to their partisanship (*party value congruence*). This would indicate that people endorse the values endorsed by those with whom they discuss politics, suggesting that values are socially reinforced rather than internal and stable. As this takes my analysis outside the experimental context, potential issues of causality are dealt with in the *Robustness Checks* section.

Measures. The dependent variable in this set of analyses is *party value congruence* and it is comprised of the endorsement of two political values by party congruence: *equality* and *morality*. Both values have two ends—a Democratic end (equality and moral tolerance) and a Republican end (inequality and moral traditionalism).¹² *Equality* is measured with six questions and *morality* with four, each having response options one to eight, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The full questions can be found in *Appendix B.1*, along with their basic descriptive statistics (also see Goren 2005 for similar operationalizations). These two variables—*equality* and *morality*—are then combined to create the main dependent variable—*party value congruence* ($\alpha=.71$)

Because value endorsement measures are often negatively-skewed (Goren et al. 2009), I follow previous approaches to ceiling effects (e.g., Caverley and Krupnikov 2017) and code the dependent variable as such: 1 if the person is entirely congruent to their partisanship with their values and 0 otherwise. For example, the dependent variable is coded 1 if a Democrat endorses *both* equality and moral tolerance to the *fullest* extent. It is also coded 1 if a Republican rejects equality and endorses moral traditionalism to the *fullest* extent. Deviation from this, such as a Democrat only partially endorsing Democratic values, is coded as 0. Again, this is to correct for the general over-endorsement of values, which leads to a ceiling effect masks potential movement within value positions (Goren et al. 2009; though see alternative specifications in *Appendix B.2*).

The independent variable of interest is a politically homogeneous versus heterogeneous social network. This variable is binary and is coded as 1 if one’s social network as reported to the ANES is completely homogenous (i.e., everyone in this network voted for the same president as did the respondent in the 2000 election); it is coded 0 otherwise. Since this variable is used to proxy social influence, the implication is that having a politically-homogeneous social network should increase the likelihood that one’s political values are aligned to their partisanship. For example, for

¹¹ Past research finds that in the 2000 ANES only 4% of respondents had networks in which everyone disagreed with them (e.g., a Democrat with a full network of Republicans), while 34% of respondents had networks in which everyone agreed with them and 48% of respondents had networks in which no one supported the other party’s candidate (Huckfeldt et al. 2004). Thus, I assume that a homogeneous network indicates a network of the same political party.


¹² While there are additional values discussed in Jacoby (2006, 2014) and Goren et al. (2009), those are either not available in the 2000 ANES dataset or are measured in a limited capacity.

Democrats, discussing politics with other Democrats should increase their endorsement of equality and moral tolerance. Likewise, for Republicans, discussing politics with other Republicans should increase their endorsement of inequality and moral traditionalism. That is, the more homogeneous one's social network is, the more one's values should conform to it.

Included in the model are controls that follow from previous political values research (e.g., Jacoby 2006, 2014) and include gender, age, income, race, education, church attendance, ideology, and political knowledge (all recoded from 0 to 1). I also control for partisan strength, political interest, political discussions, and media consumption in order to focus on the *specific* effect of homogeneous networks. The coding of all control variables can be found in *Appendix B.1*. Since I predict that homogeneous networks increase the alignment of values and party, we should see that the *homogeneous network* variable has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of *party value congruence*.

Results. Given the structure of the dependent variable, *party value congruence*, I estimate my models using logistic regression. The results from the main model ($N=583$), which includes the aforementioned control variables, show that as predicted, the effect of having a completely politically-homogeneous social network—as compared to having any deviation from this—is positive and significant ($p<.01$, see also *Table 5* and *Figure 5* in *Appendix B.2*). *Figure 2*, below, illustrates this finding as predicted probabilities—showing that being in a homogeneous network increases the probability of endorsing party congruent values by 11 percentage points, as compared to being in a network with even one incongruent person. That is, all else equal, a Democrat with a network of all Democrats is 11 percentage points more likely to endorse equality and moral tolerance than is a Democrat with even one Republican in their network. Or, all else equal, a Republican with a network of all Republicans is 11 percentage points more likely to *reject* equality and endorse moral traditionalism than is a Republican with even one Democrat in their network. These results suggest that, indeed, political values are socially reinforced.

Figure 2. Predicted Probability of Value Congruence by Network Homogeneity



The predicted probability of party value congruence for those in the homogeneous network is greater than that for those in the heterogeneous network ($p=.018$).

Robustness Checks. I next consider alternative explanations for these findings. One alternative explanation is that people who endorse partisan values also select into homogenous networks. A related alternative explanation is that the relationship between homogeneous networks and value endorsement is spurious—that strength of partisanship is moving both networks and value endorsements. Both of these explanations undermine my theoretic expectations, suggesting that it is not social influence that is affecting reported value positions.

Although experimental findings address these alternative explanations by presenting a direct causal connection between social influence and value endorsement, I also address these with the observational data at hand. I cannot entirely dismiss these possibilities, but I can provide evidence that gives them somewhat less credence. To do so, I conduct two checks. The first relies on an alternative measure of homogeneous social networks that stems from Mutz and Mondak (2006). This alternative measure only focuses on the discussion partners, whom, unlike one’s friends, one typically does *not* choose (i.e., coworkers and neighbors, or “accidental discussion partners”). This new *homogeneous networks* variable is coded the same as the original, except it is limited to *only* discussion partners who are “accidental.”

The results from this alternative operationalization show us that the more homogeneous one’s “accidental discussion partners,” the more congruent one’s political values are to their partisanship

(see *Appendix B.2, Table 5* and *Figure 6*).¹³ This trend aligns with my theoretic predictions about social influence. The second approach interacts *partisan strength* with *homogeneous networks*, under the assumption that the alternative explanations would likely lead to a significant interaction between these two. I find no such significant interaction (see *Appendix B.2, Table 5* and *Figure 7*). Again, these analyses do not remove all causal worries, but do complement the experimental analysis that addresses these worries most directly.

I also consider the robustness of the estimates in the main model in other ways. I include additional controls, recode the independent variable of interest (*homogeneous networks*) as continuous rather than dichotomous, and recode the dependent variable (*party value congruence*) from binary to both continuous and ordered (see *Appendix B.2, Table 5* and *Figures 8, 9, 10, 11*). These robustness checks do not change the general findings. Thus, following from my theoretic predictions, the results show that the political homogeneity of one's discussion partners influences their value endorsement. Particularly, I find that the more politically homogeneous one's network is, the more likely that person is to endorse party-congruent values.¹⁴

Of course, given the observational nature of the data, we cannot be certain of the causal relationship. Controls are added to both the main model and to the robustness checks models, but there is always the possibility of omitted variable bias. This causal worry is where the experimental results are most insightful—there, I control for the unobservables by random assignment, isolating social cues as the principal independent variable and enhancing the overall validity of the empirics (Shadish et al. 2002).

Discussion

This piece aimed to test the argument that political values are the result of social influence. Specifically, I argued that people adopt the political values of those around them because it looks good to do so. I tested this with both experimental and observational data in attempts to address worries about various validities (see Shadish et al. 2002). In both methods, findings lend empirical support to the theory proposed in this piece. Specifically, leveraging individual differences in self-monitoring and manipulating social cues, the experiment found that people do, in fact, adopt political values because it looks good to do so. Further, relying on social networks data from the 2000 ANES, the observational analyses implied the social transmission of values occurs outside the experimental context. These findings provide evidence of a social dimension to political values, thus giving doubt to the idea that political values can guide individuals through the political world.

These results have some limitations, though, which I will attempt to address briefly here. First, a critic might wonder where political independents fit in. The theory does not exclude pure independents and nor does the experiment. However, the observational analysis removes pure independents (not leaning independents). This is simply an artifact of the observational analysis that I use, rather than a reflection of the theory. I do presume that pure independents follow social cues in a manner similar to leaning, weak, and strong partisans—just as many individuals follow the cues of those they like and want to emulate, so would independents. Indeed, research in this

¹³ Note that given the smaller sample size ($N=227$) here, the coefficient is marginally significant ($p=.056$).

¹⁴ I also conduct an analysis that examines the effect of political discussions (without accounting for the makeup of discussion partners) on the endorsement of party-congruent political values. This result largely mimics the results from the main analysis (see *Appendix C*).

area suggests this to be the case (Klar and Krupnikov 2016), as do my experimental patterns.

A second limitation may be conflicting environments. For example, what about a Democrat who also is a churchgoer—this person would likely receive social cues from their Democratic environment to value moral tolerance, but also receive social cues from their church environment to value moral *traditionalism*. Which do they respond to? I would theorize that in these types of heterogeneous environments—where people receive competing social cues—individuals are actually the *most* stable in their values (i.e., the *least* influenced by their environment). I would predict that the social cues cancel each other out, just as competing frames cancel out framing effects (see Chong and Druckman 2007).

Lastly, one might ask if this theory and research suggest that political values are norms internalized by Democrats and Republicans. I briefly examine this possibility with survey questions at the end of the experiment asking partisans if they would be disappointed in their own partisans for not valuing their party's values and comparing this to how they would feel towards opposing partisans not valuing that value. I find suggestive evidence that while equality may be a norm in the Democratic culture, self-reliance may not be a norm in the Republican culture (see *Appendix D.1*). This gives us some insight about *why* people would alter their values—Democrats, at least, punish in-group members for not adhering to their group's equality values.

Conclusion

This research carries a number of consequences for research and the conceptualization of political values. As Seligman and Katz (1996) aptly note, “If value or value types do reorder themselves across situations, then we must ask what purpose the general value system serves.” Indeed, research relies on the notion that constructs are correctly defined and operationalized—doubts to the contrary should be given attention, especially if those constructs are as widely used as values.

Beyond the implications of these findings for research in political science, though, these findings have consequences for the practice of politics. First, the findings speak to how well individuals can reason through politics—if they can work their way through outside influence from elites, the media, and the social world to make reasonably independent decisions. Remember, if the populous does not hold stable values that guide their political decisions, the government will have trouble translating majority preferences into policies (Valentino and Nardis 2013). Unquestionably, this mitigates the effectiveness of any democratic government and lends doubt to the optimistic possibility that values can guide individuals through new political decisions, especially in the face of outside influence. Further, these findings give us some insight into the causes of ideological polarization. While some have claimed ideological polarization to be the result of a “culture war,” or a direct competition of political values (e.g., Berlin 1969; Chong 2000; Jacoby 2014; Stone 2012), my findings suggest that some ideological polarization is the result of homophily and social interactions—i.e., social polarization (Mason 2018)—where social polarization leads to increased ideological polarization, rather than the other way around.

Of course, there are possibilities that could suggest these results are not so severe to the practice of politics. It may be possible, for example, that while political values are not our political guides, other considerations can lead individuals through politics and prevent outside manipulation. It is even possible that we have *political values* that are these considerations, but that the political values we have been measuring are not them (i.e., political scientists have been measuring a different construct and there are other latent political values we are not measuring). This manuscript, though, is responding to research on political values *as we know them*, rather than

attempting to measure a new latent concept—it cannot speak to whether there are political values that we have not “discovered” yet. In essence, these possibilities question the construct validity of our political values research, and it is one that we have dealt with for decades. As Converse (1964) explains, “Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification.” I should note, in closing, that even if either of these possibilities were the case, while the practice of politics may be saved, research relying on political values would remain precarious.

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Appendix A: Experimental Data

1. Preliminary Data Participant Descriptives

Sample 1

62% female; 80% white; 60% college graduate or above; mean age 37; 32% Republican (leaning, weak, and strong), 27% Independent, 41% Democrat (leaning, weak, and strong); ideology mean of 3.09 (scale of 1 to 6); interest mean of 2.49 (scale of 1 to 6).

Sample 2

48% female; 72% white; 55% college graduate or above; mean age 37; 28% Republican (leaning, weak, and strong), 14% Independent (pure), 58% Democrat; ideology mean of 3.41 (scale of 1 to 7); interest mean of 1.72 (scale of 1 to 3).

2. Preliminary Data 1 Question Wording

We are seeking to understand people's values. In the next section, different values will be listed, along with their definitions, and you will be asked how much you support them.

[The following questions were shown to respondents in random order]

1. Freedom of expression (that is, allowing everyone to speak their mind, even if their views are offensive, unpopular, or denigrate certain people and/or groups)

- How much do you support freedom of expression? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate freedom of expression with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe freedom of expression is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
- Do you believe freedom of expression is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]

2. Protection from hurtful speech (that is, protecting people from offensive, hurtful, and denigrating speech, even if that means not allowing others to speak freely)

- How much do you support protection from hurtful speech? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate protection from hurtful speech with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe protection from hurtful speech is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
- Do you believe protection from hurtful speech is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]

decisions made; don't know]

3. Complete transparency (that is, always being honest and transparent, even if the consequences of doing so may lead to negative consequences, such as people getting hurt)

- How much do you support complete transparency? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate complete transparency with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe complete transparency is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
- Do you believe complete transparency is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]

4. Kind dishonesty (that is, not being completely truthful when it might threaten or hurt others)

- How much do you support kind dishonesty? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate kind dishonesty with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe kind dishonesty is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
- Do you believe kind dishonesty is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]

5. Unconditional material support for others (that is, helping others who are less fortunate, without regard for whether some of their misfortune is their own fault)

- How much do you support unconditional material support for others? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate unconditional material support for others with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe unconditional material support for others is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
- Do you believe unconditional material support for others is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]

6. “Teaching a man to fish” (that is, giving people skills to help themselves, without providing them with material help)

- How much do you support “teaching a man to fish”? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate “teaching a man to fish” with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]

- Do you believe “teaching a man to fish” is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don’t know]
- Do you believe “teaching a man to fish” is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don’t know]

7. Compromise (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate)

- How much do you support compromise? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate compromise with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe compromise is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don’t know]
- Do you believe compromise is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don’t know]

8. Standing your ground (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate)

- How much do you support standing your ground? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate standing your ground with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe standing your ground is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don’t know]
- Do you believe standing your ground is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don’t know]

9. Retaliation (that is, treating those who have wronged you with the deserved equally negative treatment)

- How much do you support retaliation? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate retaliation with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe retaliation is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don’t know]
- Do you believe retaliation is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don’t know]

10. Responding to injury without revenge (that is, even if you have been wronged, treating everyone positively and with respect)

- How much do you support responding to injury without revenge? [strongly/somewhat/neutral/not much/not at all]
- Do you associate responding to injury without revenge with a political party? [yes, with the Democratic Party; yes, with the Republican Party; no, neither party]
- Do you believe responding to injury without revenge is a value that can determine the types of political decisions that people make? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of political decisions made; don't know]
- Do you believe responding to injury without revenge is a value that can determine the types of decisions people make in their daily lives? [yes, it is a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; no, it is not a value that can determine the types of daily life decisions made; don't know]

The last set of questions asks you about various groups of people and how you feel towards them.

[the following options are listed in random order]

1. How much would you want to have in common with the following types of people? [1-10, with 1 being I would not want to have anything in common with this group, and 10 being I would want to have most things in common with this group]

- a. People who support President Donald Trump [1-10]
- b. People who oppose President Donald Trump [1-10]
- c. People who think Donald Trump is doing a good job as President [1-10]
- d. People who think Donald Trump is doing a poor job as President [1-10]
- e. People who listen to news sources that support both parties [1-10]
- f. People who are loyal to their party [1-10]
- g. People who are political independents [1-10]
- h. People who are political moderates [1-10]
- i. People who know a lot about politics [1-10]

3. Preliminary Data 1 Results

[From most ideal to least ideal]

1. How much do Mturk participants support these hypothetical values (1-5, 1 meaning most support)—mean, sd?
 - a. Protection from hurtful speech—3.18, 1.39
 - b. Kind dishonesty—3.19, 1.18
 - c. Material support—2.38, 1.22
 - d. Retaliation—3.76, 1.11
 - e. Standing your ground—2.21, 1.12
 - f. No revenge—2.02, 1.13
 - g. Compromise—1.97, 0.93
 - h. Teaching a man to fish—1.72, 0.96
 - i. Complete transparency—1.72, 0.89
 - j. Freedom of expression—1.48, 0.76
2. Do participants associate these hypothetical values with political parties (% no party)?
 - a. Complete transparency (82%)

- b. Kind dishonesty (76%)
 - c. Revenge (63%)
 - d. Compromise (60%)
 - e. Retaliation (52%)
 - f. Freedom of expression (51%)
 - g. Teaching a man to fish (50%)
 - h. Standing your ground (48%)
 - i. Protection from hurtful speech (46%)
 - j. Material support (40%)
3. Do participants see these hypothetical values as potential political values?
- a. Compromise (80%)
 - b. Freedom of expression (73%)
 - c. Standing your ground (73%)
 - d. Complete transparency (63%)
 - e. Material support (62%)
 - f. Teaching a man to fish (60%)
 - g. Retaliation (55%)
 - h. Revenge (53%)
 - i. Protection from hurtful speech (52%)
 - j. Kind dishonesty (33%)
4. Do participants see these hypothetical values as potential general values?
- a. Compromise (86%)
 - b. Freedom of expression (80%)
 - c. Teaching a man to fish (77%)
 - d. Complete transparency (76%)
 - e. Standing your ground (76%)
 - f. Revenge (74%)
 - g. Material support (71%)
 - h. Retaliation (67%)
 - i. Kind dishonesty (64%)
 - j. Protection from hurtful speech (63%)

Table 1. Attitudes Towards Groups

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Trump supporters	4.28	3.20
Trump opponents	6.28	3.21
Trump good job	4.19	3.15
Trump poor job	6.40	3.18
Balanced news	7.17	2.38
Party Loyal	5.37	2.38
Independent	6.61	2.30
Moderate	6.43	2.35
Knowledgeable	6.57	2.31

Scale 1-10 (negative to positive)

4. Preliminary Data 2 Question Wording

Next, you will be asked to consider whether certain values are compatible.

1. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
 - Freedom of expression (that is, allowing everyone to speak their mind, even if their views are offensive, unpopular, or denigrate certain people and groups) and Protection from hurtful speech (that is, protecting people from offensive, hurtful and denigrating speech, even if that means not allowing others to speak freely)
 - [if yes]: which value do you support more [freedom of expression, protection from hurtful speech]
2. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
 - Complete transparency (that is, always being honest and transparent, even if the consequences of doing so may lead to negative consequences, such as people getting hurt) and Kind dishonesty (that is, not being completely truthful when it might threaten or hurt others)
 - [if yes]: which value do you support more [complete transparency, kind dishonesty]
3. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
 - Unconditional material support for others (that is, helping others who are less fortunate, without regard for whether some of their misfortune is their own fault) and “Teaching a man to fish” (that is, giving people skills to help themselves, without providing them with material help)
 - [if yes]: which value do you support more [unconditional material support for others, “teaching a man to fish”]
4. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]
 - Compromise (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) and Standing your ground (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate)
 - [if yes]: which value do you support more [compromise, standing your ground]
5. Do you believe that the following values are somewhat in opposition with each other (that is, do you believe that if you support one of the values, it makes it more difficult to support the other) or do you believe that the two values are compatible (that is, you can equally support and rely on both values)? [yes, I believe that the values are somewhat in opposition to each

other; no, I believe that the two values are compatible; don't know]

- Retaliation (that is, treating those who have wronged you with the deserved equally negative treatment) and Responding to injury without revenge (that is, even if you have been wronged, treating everyone positively and with respect)
 - [if yes]: which value do you support more [retaliation, responding to injury without revenge]

5. Preliminary Data 2 Results

Table 2. Support for Opposing Values

Pairs	Opposed?	(%)	Choice	(%)
Speech	Opposed	70.55	Freedom Speech	78.64
	Compatible	29.45	Protection	21.36
Honesty	Opposed	76.35	Transparency	74.34
	Compatible	23.65	Honesty	25.66
Support	Opposed	48.92	Support	29.41
	Compatible	51.08	Teaching	70.59
Compromise	Opposed	78.62	Compromise	70.18
	Compatible	21.38	Standing Ground	29.82
Revenge	Opposed	83.45	Retaliation	19.17
	Compatible	16.55	No Revenge	80.83

6. Bots on MTurk

To examine if bots influenced my results, I examined IP addresses, durations of responses in seconds, and response IDs to see if there were any patterns of overlap. I find nothing jarring about these tables, as all three hardly have any overlap. Out of the 401 responses, only 2 IP addresses repeat twice (i.e., every other IP address is unique and used only once). Every response ID is unique. For duration in seconds, most of the 401 responses had unique duration (or, sometimes, two responses with the same duration). Much less had three or more responses with the same duration (3 responses with same time=23 occurrences; 4 responses with same time=3 occurrences), and the distribution of time is unimodal and relatively normal. These patterns do not suggest bots altered my results.

7. Experiment Question Wording

[Pretreatment Questions]

1. [pid] Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? [Republican, Democrat, Independent, other, don't know]
 - a. 1a. If 1 or 2: Would you call yourself a strong [Republican / Democrat] or a not very strong [Republican / Democrat]? [strong, not strong]
 - b. 1b. If 3 or 4 or 5: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party? [Republican, Democrat, neither]
2. [ideology] We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? [extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate, middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely conservative, don't know/haven't thought much about it]

3. [attention] Some people don't pay much attention to political news. How about you? Would you say that you are very much interested, somewhat interested, or not interested at all in political news? [very much interested/somewhat interested/not interested at all]
4. [discuss] How many days in the past week did you talk about politics with your family or friends? [never, one day a week, two days a week, three days a week, four days a week, five days a week, six days a week, seven days a week]
5. [media] How many days in the past week did you watch political news on television, read about politics in a newspaper (either online or in print), and/or listen to politics on the radio? [never, one day a week, two days a week, three days a week, four days a week, five days a week, six days a week, seven days a week]
6. [gender] What is your gender? [male, female]
7. [age] What is your age? []
8. [race] What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? [white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, other]
9. [education] What is the highest level of education that you have completed? [did not complete a high school degree, high school degree, some college, Associate's degree, Bachelor's degree, graduate or professional degree]
10. [self-monitoring 1] When you are with other people, how often do you put on a show to impress or entertain them? [always, most of the time, some of the time, once in a while, never]
11. [self-monitoring 2] When you are in a group of people, how often are you the center of attention? [always, most of the time, some of the time, once in a while, never]
12. [self-monitoring 3] How good or poor of an actor would you be? [excellent, good, fair, poor, very poor]

[Treatment: RA to no cue or cue condition]

[No Cue Condition]

People vary greatly on which value they believe in: *compromise* (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) or *standing your ground* (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate). What about you—which do you believe in more? [compromise/standing your ground/don't know]

[Cue Condition]

People vary greatly on which value they believe in: *compromise* (that is, compromising with the other side even on issues that are very important to you in order to ensure that there is no stalemate) or *standing your ground* (that is, refusing to compromise on issues that are very important to you, even if it means risking a stalemate). Interestingly, though, researchers have shown that those who listen to news sources that support both political parties tend to value *compromise* over *standing your ground*. What about you—which do you believe in more? [compromise/standing your ground/don't know]

1. [issue outcome] How do you feel about the recent government shutdown—do you think Democrats should have compromised with Republicans on the budget or was it better that they stood their ground? [they should have compromised/they were right to stand their ground/don't know]

[questions presented in random order]

1. [values as norms 1] How do you feel when a Republican does not value self-reliance (that is,

believing that our country would be much better off if there were more emphasis on determination, perseverance, and hard work)? [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other]


2. [values as norms 2] How do you feel when a Democrat does not value self-reliance (that is, believing that our country would be much better off if there were more emphasis on determination, perseverance, and hard work)? [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other]
3. [values as norms 3] How do you feel when a Republican does not value equality? (that is, making sure that everyone has the same chance to get ahead in life) [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other]
4. [values as norms 4] How do you feel when a Democrat does not value equality? (that is, making sure that everyone has the same chance to get ahead in life) [disappointed in them/proud of them/it does not matter/other]
5. Please leave any comments you have about this study: [_____]

8. Marginal Effects with Continuous Self-Monitoring Variable

Below, we can see that the effect of the social cue monotonically increases as self-monitoring increases.¹ It does not become positive and significant until the self-monitoring trait is at least equal to 8 (on a scale from 3 to 15, from low to high self-monitors). Again, this supports the first prediction, demonstrating that those who change their behavior in response to social pressure—those whose goal it is to look good to others (i.e., high self-monitors)—alter their value endorsements in response to social cues when those social cues indicate it is desirable to do so.

¹ The marginal effects plot is based on a logit regression predicting endorsement of compromise (as opposed to standing your ground) by an interaction between the treatment and a continuous measure of self-monitoring.

Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Social Cue on Value Endorsement by Self-Monitoring



9. Effect of Social Cue by Self-Monitoring

This table examines if the effect of the social cue (statistically) differs depending on if one is a low or high self-monitor. The logit includes the treatment dummy variable, the self-monitoring dummy variable (split at the median), and an interaction between these two terms and I conduct odds ratios for ease of interpretation. The results show that when we move from low to high self-monitoring, the odds of the social cue influencing value endorsement increases by almost four-fold. This change is statistically significant at conventional levels ($p < .05$).

Table 3. Effect of Social Cue by Low and High Self-Monitors

	Odds Ratio	Standard Error	Z-Statistic	P-Value
Treatment	0.93	.40	0.19	.851
Self-Monitoring	0.62	.43	1.10	.272
Treat*SM	3.96	.62	2.22	.026
Constant	1.53	.29	1.43	.152

10. Partisanship Interactions

The following figures illustrate that Democrats and Republicans act in similar ways in the experiment. These figures are based on difference-in-means tests of compromise endorsement (scale 0-1) by the treatment (no cue or cue) and high and low self-monitors (median split). Confidence intervals are at 95%.

Figure 2. *Compromise Endorsement by Treatment, Self-Monitoring (Democrats, N=100)*






Figure 3. *Compromise Endorsement by Treatment, Self-Monitoring (Republicans, N=70)*



11. Robustness Check—Experimental Findings with Controls

Considering the self-monitoring trait is measured rather than manipulated, I also run the same model with controls (partisanship, ideology, education, race, age, gender, media usage, partaking in political discussions, and interest in politics). I find the same results.

Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Social Cue on Value Endorsement by Self-Monitoring, Controls



Appendix B: 2000 ANES Data

1. Measures

Equality is operationalized with six questions with response options one to eight, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. These questions are: (1) “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed” (reverse coded); (2) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country”; (3) “One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance” (reverse coded); (4) “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others”; (5) “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are”; (6) and “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems” (reverse coded).

Morality is operationalized with four questions with response options one to eight from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Note that this variable is composed of Goren’s (2005) *moral tolerance* and *moral traditionalism* variable (i.e., both operationalizations are included but grouped into one variable). These questions were: (1) “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society”; (2) “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes” (reverse coded); (3) “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties”; and (4) “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own” (reverse coded).

Controls: *age* (18-97+ continuous, recoded 0 to 1), *income* (22-scale ordinal, higher values=higher income, recoded 0 to 1), *male* (0=female, 1=male), *white* (0=non-white, 1=white), *black* (0=non-black, 1=black), *Hispanic* (0=non-Hispanic, 1=Hispanic), *church* (5-scale ordinal, higher values=more often, recoded 0 to 1), *education* (7-scale ordinal, higher values=more education, recoded 0 to 1), *ideology* (7-scale ordinal, higher values=more conservative, recoded 0 to 1), *partisan strength* (4-scale ordinal, higher values=stronger partisanship, recoded 0 to 1), *political interest* (3-scale ordinal, higher values=more interested, recoded 0 to 1), *media consumption* (14-scale ordinal, sum of *TV news* and *print news*—both 0 to 7, indicating the number of days watching or reading news, recoded 0 to 1), *political discussions* (7-scale ordinal indicating number of days discussing politics, recoded 0 to 1), *political knowledge* (4-scale ordinal, higher values=more knowledge, recoded 0 to 1).

Table 4. Value Endorsement Descriptive Statistics

Question	Observations	Mean	SD
Equality 1	1,549	4.29	1.05
Equality 2	1,547	3.16	1.36
Equality 3	1,547	3.09	1.34
Equality 4	1,536	2.97	1.35
Equality 5	1,543	3.37	1.26
Equality 6	1,547	3.58	1.26
Morality 1	1,542	2.37	1.27
Morality 2	1,548	2.76	1.44
Morality 3	1,548	1.69	0.99
Morality 4	1,545	3.54	1.24

Scale: 1-5

2. Main Model and Robustness Checks

Below is the main model from the main text (“Main Model”—*Figure 5*), the endogeneity check approach recommended by Mutz and Mondak (“Mutz and Mondak”—*Figure 6*), the main model with an interaction between homogeneous networks and partisan strength (“PID Strength”—*Figure 7*), the main model with additional controls (“Additional Controls”—*Figure 8*), the main model with the independent variable of interest (*homogeneous networks*) as continuous rather than binary (“Continuous IV”—*Figure 9*), and the main model with the dependent variable (*party value congruence*) as continuous rather than binary (“Continuous DV”—*Figure 10*). Additionally, I have included a figure illustrating the dependent variable (*party value congruence*) as ordered—rather than binary or continuous (*Figure 11*). The first five models are estimated using logistic regression, the sixth model is estimated with OLS, and the seventh model is estimated with ordered logit.

Table 5. Logistic Regression Predicting Party Value Congruence

Main Model	Mutz and Mondak ²	PID Strength ³	Additional Controls ⁴	Continuous	Continuous
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² As mentioned in the main text, there are alternative explanations for these findings. One alternative explanation is that those who strongly believe in particular political values will both choose the congruent political party to join *and* be more inclined to have politically homogeneous networks. This explanation suggests a different causal relationship in which political value endorsement leads to increased network homogeneity. A second alternative explanation is that the relationship between network homogeneity and value endorsement is spurious—that strength of partisanship is moving both network homogeneity and value endorsements. Both of these explanations undermine my theoretic expectations, suggesting that it is not social influence that is affecting reported value positions. To provide evidence that gives these alternative explanations less credence, I conduct two robustness checks. This is the first, explained in the main text, which relies on an alternative measure of networks—limited to only “accidental” discussion partners or neighbors and co-workers—as recommended by Mutz and Mondak (2006). Keep in mind the limiting sample size ($N=227$) leads to a marginally significant coefficient ($p=.056$). See also *Figure 6*.

³ This is the second robustness check to address endogeneity concerns, which makes use of the partisan strength variable by interacting *homogeneous networks* with *partisan strength*. Both of the previously explained alternative explanations for the findings—1) that those who strongly believe in political values are then both choosing the congruent party and homogeneous networks, and 2) that partisan strength drives both value endorsement and homogeneous networks—would imply that the effect of the homogeneous network variable should depend on partisan strength. That is, if those who strongly believe in political values are stronger partisans and also choose more homogeneous networks, the effect of homogeneous networks should be more pronounced among the strong partisans than the weak partisans. Again, I test this possibility with an interaction between *homogeneous networks* and *partisan strength*, the assumption being that if the alternative explanations are true, then we would likely see a positive interaction between the strength of one’s partisanship and how homogeneous one’s network is. We can see that there is no significant interaction ($p=.629$), suggesting that we can worry less about endogeneity. See also *Figure 7*.

⁴ Model with additional controls. See also *Figure 8*. Coded as such: *religion* (1=protestant, 2=catholic, 3=Jewish, 0=other) and *occupation* (1=executive, administrative, managerial, 2=professional specialty occupations, 3=technicians and related support occupations, 4=sales occupation, 5=administrative support, including clerical, 6=private household, 7=protective service, 8=service except protective and household, 9=farming, forestry, and fishing occupations,

					IV ⁵	DV ⁶
Homogeneous Networks	0.508 (0.185)	0.611 (0.320)	0.280 (0.505)	0.482 (0.191)	0.696 (0.262)	0.0224 (0.0116)
Homogeneous Networks * Strength	-	-	0.425 (0.879)	-	-	-
Age	-1.129 (0.658)	-3.018 (1.305)	-1.106 (0.660)	-1.112 (0.687)	-1.111 (0.656)	-0.0250 (0.0397)
Income	-0.430 (0.698)	-0.0812 (1.395)	-0.444 (0.699)	-0.417 (0.747)	-0.402 (0.695)	-0.0462 (0.0462)
Male	0.0959 (0.196)	-0.131 (0.333)	-0.0855 (0.197)	-0.0780 (0.226)	-0.135 (0.197)	0.0127 (0.0122)
White	-0.253 (0.438)	-0.449 (0.815)	-0.253 (0.437)	-0.181 (0.467)	-0.247 (0.437)	-0.00571 (0.0257)
Black	-0.435 (0.526)	-0.141 (0.953)	-0.442 (0.527)	-0.477 (0.561)	-0.443 (0.526)	0.0618 (0.0319)
Hispanic	-0.230 (0.602)	0.0884 (1.074)	-0.232 (0.602)	-0.174 (0.641)	-0.250 (0.602)	-0.0187 (0.0390)
Church	-0.456 (0.317)	-0.482 (0.540)	-0.464 (0.317)	-0.509 (0.337)	-0.448 (0.317)	-0.0417 (0.0199)
Education	0.408 (0.494)	-0.546 (0.889)	0.418 (0.495)	-0.0123 (0.604)	0.394 (0.494)	-0.0141 (0.0302)
Strength	0.141 (0.451)	0.0284 (0.811)	-0.0581 (0.610)	0.145 (0.473)	0.149 (0.450)	0.0730 (0.0282)
Ideology	0.458 (0.357)	0.905 (0.642)	0.455 (0.358)	0.600 (0.374)	0.436 (0.358)	-0.147 (0.0237)
Interest	0.271 (0.327)	0.638 (0.579)	0.276 (0.328)	0.375 (0.338)	0.273 (0.328)	0.0369 (0.0214)
Media	0.218 (0.358)	1.021 (0.657)	0.211 (0.359)	0.138 (0.371)	0.229 (0.358)	0.00744 (0.0223)
Discuss	0.0135 (0.321)	-0.0484 (0.601)	0.0139 (0.321)	-0.0828 (0.336)	-0.0741 (0.323)	0.00615 (0.0194)
Knowledge	-0.221 (0.434)	-0.0637 (0.778)	-0.212 (0.435)	-0.168 (0.460)	-0.266 (0.436)	0.0371 (0.0288)

10=precision production, craft and repair occupations, 11=machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors, 12=transportation and material moving occupations, 13=handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers, 14=member of armed forces). These controls do not change the results.

⁵ Model with *homogeneous networks* as continuous rather than binary. See also *Figure 9*. This alternative specification does not change the general results.

⁶ Model with *party value congruence* as continuous rather than binary. OLS is thus estimated here. Note that in this model, the effect of *homogeneous networks* on the continuous *party value congruence* variable is not as strong (see *Figure 10*). This is where *Figure 11* comes in—here, *party value congruence* is coded as 2 when respondents are entirely congruent with their values to their partisanship (i.e., the same as “1” in the main model); it is coded as 1 when respondents are completely congruent with one of their values to their partisanship (i.e., they are congruent with either equality or morality, but not both); it is coded as 0 when respondents deviate from complete congruence with both of these values (the same as “0” in the main model). I thus estimate ordered logit and we can see that there is something particular about when the dependent variable is equal to 1 (from the main model)—the *complete* congruence of values is where we see the effect of *homogeneous networks*.

Protestant	-	-	-	0.117	-	-
				(0.265)		
Catholic	-	-	-	-0.0524	-	-
				(0.291)		
Jewish	-	-	-	-1.210	-	-
				(1.128)		
Executive/admin /managerial	-	-	-	-0.201	-	-
				(0.431)		
Professional specialty	-	-	-	0.0797	-	-
				(0.396)		
Technicians/etc.	-	-	-	-0.395	-	-
				(0.535)		
Sales	-	-	-	-0.732	-	-
				(0.483)		
Admin support, including clerical	-	-	-	0.0847	-	-
				(0.412)		
Protective service	-	-	-	0.890	-	-
				(0.646)		
Service except protective/household	-	-	-	-1.235	-	-
				(0.592)		
Farming/forestry/fishing	-	-	-	-0.355	-	-
				(0.965)		
Precision production /craft/repair	-	-	-	-0.169	-	-
				(0.519)		
Machine operators /assemblers/inspectors	-	-	-	-0.249	-	-
				(0.631)		
Transportation/material moving	-	-	-	-1.008	-	-
				(0.888)		
Constant	-0.434	-0.093	-0.350	-0.125	-0.567	0.607
	(0.664)	(1.285)	(0.686)	(0.803)	(0.665)	(0.045)
Observations	583	227	583	569	583	583

Models 1-5: standard errors in parentheses. Model 6: robust standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 5. Homogeneous Social Networks on Party Value Congruence—Main Model




Figure 6. Homogeneous Social Networks on Party Value Congruence—Mutz and Mondak




Figure 7. Homogeneous Social Networks on Party Value Congruence by PID Strength—PID Strength




Figure 8. Homogeneous Social Networks on Party Value Congruence—Additional Controls




Figure 9. Homogeneous Social Networks on Party Value Congruence—Continuous IV




Figure 10. Homogeneous Social Networks on Party Value Congruence—Continuous DV





Figure 11. Homogeneous Social Networks on Party Value Congruence—Ordered DV



Appendix C: Full ANES Data

1. Methods

This set of analyses tests the prediction that political discussions will increase the congruence of one's political values to their partisanship. Here I rely on the frequency of political discussions as a *proxy* for the likelihood an individual receives social cues about values. This approach follows from previous research. Huckfeldt et al. (2013), for example, argue that interpersonal discussions are a useful measure of social influence. I note, though, that while recent research suggests that people are significantly more likely to discuss politics with like-minded others (e.g., Huckfeldt et al. 2013; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason 2015, 2018), it is also possible that political discussions may be happening in more heterogeneous contexts as well, which is not captured by the *discuss* variable but is captured in the *homogeneous networks* variable. This is the main reason why this analysis is in the appendix and the analysis that relies on the *homogeneous networks* variable is in the main text.

In this particular set of analyses, I view discussions as vehicles for social pressure—as it is a forum where one is both able to discover that those around them endorse particular political values as well as be socially pressured to do the same. This implies that the more often one engages in discussions, the more likely she will be to receive social cues about values, and therefore the more she should align her values in response to those cues. That is, discussions should increase the likelihood that people get social cues from others about what partisans like them value. The result, I predict, is a greater alignment of one's reported values to their partisanship.

Data are drawn from the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative data file. The set of analyses is restricted to 1986 to 2000, when the main independent variable (political discussions), dependent variables, and controls were measured. As a reminder, in this analysis I use the political discussions variable as a proxy for the likelihood of receiving social cues about values. I thus predict that there will be a positive, significant effect of political discussions (*discuss*) on the likelihood one endorses party congruent values, suggesting that those who discuss politics with family and friends more often will endorse more socially desirable values (i.e., the values their party endorses).

2. Measures

The dependent variable in this set of analyses is *party value congruence*—the same binary dependent variable from the 2000 ANES network analysis ($\alpha=.76$). The independent variable of interest is how often one discusses politics with friends and family. This discussion variable is based on a question that asks individuals to indicate how many days per week they discuss politics with friends and family. For ease of coefficient comparison, the variable ranges from 0 to 1. Included in the primary model are the same as in the main text's primary model, with the exception that here I control for year because the dataset is cumulative.

The coding of the controls are as such: *year* (1986 to 2000, two-year intervals), *male* (dummy, 0=female, 1=male), *age* (continuous, recoded 0 to 1), *income* (five-scale ordinal, recoded 0 to 1), *black* (dummy, 0=non-black, 1=black), *Hispanic* (dummy, 0=non-Hispanic, 1=Hispanic), *education* (four-scale ordinal, recoded 0 to 1), *ideology* (seven-scale ordinal, higher values=more conservative, recoded 0 to 1), *partisan strength* (four-scale ordinal, higher values=stronger partisanship, recoded 0 to 1), *political interest* (three-scale ordinal, higher values=more interested, recoded 0 to 1), *media consumption* (0-14, sum of *TV news* and *print news*—both 0 to 7, indicating the number of days watching or reading news, recoded 0 to 1), and *political knowledge* (0=low knowledge, 1=high knowledge).

3. Results

Given the structure of the dependent variable, *party value congruence*, I estimate my models using logistic regression and calculate odds ratios for ease of coefficient interpretation. The primary model, which includes the aforementioned control variables, is shown in *Figure 12*, below. Since I predict that the more often one discusses politics the more congruent their values will be to their partisanship, we should see that *discuss* has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of *party value congruence*. This is exactly what we see—*discuss* = .064, $p < 0.002$.

This means that people who spend more time discussing politics—and receive more social cues—are more likely to have values that are congruent to their party. These results suggest that, indeed, political values are socially reinforced. To consider the robustness of the estimates, I estimate several additional models that alter the specifications of the primary model by changing the coding of the dependent variable (*party value congruence*). *Figure 13* changes the coding of the dependent variable from binary to continuous, thus estimating OLS rather than logit. *Figure 14* changes the coding of the dependent variable from binary to ordered, where the dependent variable is coded as 2 when respondents are entirely congruent with their values to their partisanship (i.e., the same as “1” in *Figure 12*); it is coded as 1 when respondents are completely congruent with *one* of their values to their partisanship (i.e., they are congruent with either equality or morality, but not both); it is coded 0 when respondents deviate from complete congruence with both of these values (the same “0” from *Figure 12*)—I thus estimate ordered logit. None of these robustness checks alter the effect of *discuss* on *party value congruence*.

Figure 12. Political Discussions on Party Value Congruence (Logit)




Figure 13. Political Discussions on Party Value Congruence (OLS)




Figure 14. Political Discussions on Party Value Congruence (Ordered)





Figure 15. Political Discussions on Party Value Congruence (Logit)—No Fixed Effects



Appendix D: Additional Data

1. Values as Norms

To examine this question, I ask respondents four questions at the end of the experiment: how they would feel if a co-partisan did not value equality, how they would feel if an opposing partisan did not value equality, how they would feel if a co-partisan did not value self-reliance, and how they would feel if an opposing partisan did not value self-reliance. I asked these under the assumption that if these values were indeed norms, partisans should punish co-partisans for not valuing their party's values, but not punish opposing partisans for not valuing these values. Simple disappointment in others not valuing one's party's values would lead to participants equally punishing both co-partisans and opposing partisans.

First, I conduct two simple chi-squared tests to see how partisans feel about others not valuing equality and then not valuing self-reliance, seeing if they feel differently depending on if the other person is a Republican or a Democrat. Both of these tests produce highly significant differences ($p < .000$). To see what is going on more specifically, I create a binary dependent variable that is 1 if the participant says they are disappointed in the person and 0 if they say they are proud, say it doesn't matter, or say other. I then conduct various t-tests, with two interests: how Democrats view other Democrats who don't endorse equality as compared to how they view Republicans who don't endorse equality ($p = .007$), and how Republicans view other Republicans who don't endorse self-reliance as compared to how they view Democrats who don't endorse self-reliance ($p = .595$). There seems to be little norm among Republicans with self-reliance, but quite a strong norm among Democrats with equality. This could be due to a difference between either Republicans and Democrats or equality and self-reliance (or both).

Table 6. Views Towards Partisans' Values

Subjects	Value	Objects	Observations	Mean	SE	P-value
Republicans	Equality	Republicans	112	.625	.05	1.00
		Democrats	112	.625	.05	
	Self-Reliance	Republicans	117	.786	.04	.595
		Democrats	117	.769	.04	
Democrats	Equality	Republicans	179	.89	.02	.007
		Democrats	179	.95	.02	
	Self-Reliance	Republicans	163	.48	.04	.435
		Democrats	163	.51	.04	